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Artificial Intelligence and Cyber Power 
from a Strategic Perspective 
by Michael Mayer
Advances in artificial intelligence (AI) will enable highly capable autonomous 
weapon systems to be used on the conventional battlefield and in cyberspace. This 
report provides an overview of the strategic aspects of AI and cyber power.
Artificial intelligence (AI) has made incred-
ible progress, resulting in highly capable soft-
ware and advanced autonomous machines. 
Meanwhile, the cyber domain has become a 
battleground for access, influence, security 
and control. The strategic implications of 
these parallel developments will be pro-
found, particularly when combined. 
This report, divided into three articles, 
offers an introduction to both artificial intel-
ligence and cyber power. The first article pro-
vides an overview of artificial intelligence, 
including the various approaches, current 
capabilities, and strategic applications of the 
technology. The second article covers strate-
gic considerations relevant to cyber power, 
including computer network exploitation 
and offense capabilities.
Finally, the third article explores how the 
integration of these two technologies greatly 
enhances both intrusion detection and of-
fensive network penetration capabilities, but 
complicates adequate command and control. 
I then look ahead to future strategic develop-
ments given current trends, including the 
potential for super-intelligence.
• Artificial intelligence can outper-
form humans at narrowly defined 
tasks and will enable a new genera-
tion of autonomous weapon systems.
• Cyberspace will play a crucial role 
in future conflicts due to the inte-
gration of digital infrastructure in 
society and the expected prevalence 
of autonomous systems on the bat-
tlefield.
• AI cyber weapons create a dangerous 
class of persistent threats that can 
actively and quickly adjust tactics as 
they relentlessly and independently 
probe and attack networks.
 
Take aways
Introduction to Artificial Intelligence
© Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, Oslo 2018. ISSN 1894-4795
IFS Insights 4/2018 2
Artificial intelligence (AI) is developing at 
an astounding rate. Driven by exponential 
growth in computing power, industrial and 
military robotic applications exhibit greater 
degrees of automation, using complex al-
gorithms to perform increasingly complex 
operations and leveraging machine-learning 
techniques that allow computer systems to 
detect patterns and make predictions based 
on the data. Machines are becoming more 
capable of rationally solving complex prob-
lems in whatever real-world circumstances 
they encounter. 
These developments have sweeping so-
cietal implications. Today’s self-driving ve-
hicles and smart phone personal assistants 
– like Apple’s Siri – are simply the beginning 
of a new era of intelligent machines. These 
machines are able to analyze their surround-
ings and respond accordingly and even inde-
pendently, whether in the workplace or on 
the battlefield. Military leaders in the U.S., 
China, and Russia are investing heavily in 
these technologies in the belief that AI and 
autonomy will be decisive in future conflict 
scenarios.
ALPHA GO
On 20 March 2016, an AI program specifi-
cally designed to play the ancient Chinese 
game of Go soundly defeated the best human 
player of the game in a special tournament 
held in Seoul, South Korea. The resounding 
victory (four games to one) by the program, 
named AlphaGo, was immediately heralded 
as a significant milestone for AI technology 
due to the complexity of the game it was 
playing. Researchers assumed it would take 
at least another decade for a machine to beat 
Military leaders are investing heavily in artificial intelligence technologies in the 
belief that AI and autonomy will be decisive in future conflict scenarios.
Article One
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a top-ranked human player. Instead, it only 
took a year. 
The game’s simplicity – using black and 
white stones on a 19 by 19 grid with the 
objective of covering as much of the board 
as possible – is part of what makes it so dif-
ficult, particularly compared with chess, an-
other game famously mastered by an earlier 
form of machine intelligence. After the first 
two moves in chess, there are 400 possible 
next moves compared with nearly 130,000 
possible options in Go. 
The computer algorithms that pow-
ered IBM’s Deep Blue to victory over Gary 
Kasparov in 1996 could use sheer comput-
ing power to analyze the value of each of a 
huge number of potential moves. This “brute 
force” approach could not be applied to Go 
due to the huge difference in possible varia-
tions. It is for this reason that Go has been 
called the “Holy Grail” of artificial intelli-
gence.
Human players rely on a combination 
of strategy, experience, and – notably – in-
tuition. Google’s DeepMind artificial intel-
ligence group, the team behind AlphaGo, 
relied on a special type of AI machine learn-
ing modeled after the human brain that is 
particularly good at recognizing patterns in 
data and has the ability to “teach itself” by 
endlessly playing matches with itself. 
The machine was learning to play in a 
human-like fashion, only at a mindboggling 
pace that compared with how much experi-
ence a human might acquire after playing the 
game for 80 straight years. AlphaGo managed 
to surprise the reigning world champion, Lee 
Sedol, with a nearly flawless play and unex-
pected moves that Go experts even called 
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“beautiful”. As journalist Christopher Moyer 
commented, if AlphaGo “can learn to conquer 
Go ... it can learn to conquer anything easier 
than Go – which amounts to a lot of things.”
DEFINING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
In a 2010 book on the subject, Nils Nilsson 
defined artificial intelligence (AI) as “that 
activity devoted to making machines intel-
ligent, and intelligence is that quality that 
enables an entity to function appropriately 
and with foresight in its environment.” Given 
this definition, which is used approvingly by 
other experts in the field, one might think 
of machine intelligence on a spectrum that 
incorporates simple digital calculators and 
smart thermostats at the lower end, and soft-
ware controlling self-driving vehicles or play-
ing the game of Go at the higher end. 
The decisive (and exciting) factor for AI 
is an ability to combine computation and 
information processing in a way that goes 
beyond simple pre-programmed functions or 
“number crunching.” Many systems today use 
complex series of algorithms that allow com-
puter systems to detect patterns in and make 
predictions based on data. These algorithms 
are linear, step-by-step sets of rules (often 
containing conditional “if-then” statements) 
used to accomplish specific tasks. 
With recent improvements to AI, ma-
chines go beyond such structured algorithms 
and are increasingly capable of expanding 
their own knowledge base and range of re-
sponses. Thereby, they are able to rationally 
solve complex problems and achieve their 
goals in whatever real-world circumstances 
they encounter.
APPROACHES TO AI
The field of artificial intelligence has pro-
gressed so rapidly and profoundly that it 
suffers from what some refer to as the “AI 
effect,” whereby machines are able to per-
form a uniquely new task only to have it 
soon accepted as a normal machine function 
and therefore not “intelligent”. The frontier 
of AI, according to one report by Stanford 
University, is constantly evolving in a con-
tinuous and incremental way. 
The field emerged around the time of 
the first computational machines during 
the 1940s, although the term artificial intel-
ligence was coined a decade later by John 
McCarthy during the 1956 British Dartmouth 
Summer Conference. Perhaps one of the 
most well-known tests for machine intelli-
gence was suggested by Alan Turing in 1950: 
whether a human interrogator could deter-
mine if the subject was a computer based 
purely on its responses to questions. 
As Andrew Ilachinski from the U.S. think 
tank CNA pointed out, the capabilities need-
ed to pass the Turing test nicely summarize 
the primary areas of AI research:
Natural language processing: automatic 
speech recognition and the ability to ver-
balize responses
Knowledge representation: to organize the 
system’s knowledge base
Automated reasoning – the system has the 
ability to draw inferences from this knowl-
edge and respond to queries
Machine learning – the system incorporates 
new information into its knowledge base 
and finds patterns in the data
 
Users of the Apple iPhone or automated cus-
tomer service platforms will recognize the 
progress made by artificial intelligence – but 
also its limitations. Whether it is an AI such 
as Siri or a customer service interactive voice 
response (IVR) “chatbot” programmed to 
assist in document retrieval or other com-
mon tasks, the speech recognition algorithms 
are impressive, yet frustratingly inadequate. 
Clearly, these systems will not yet fool a hu-
man, although advances in logic processing 
and understanding contextual clues will 
gradually bring machine intelligence closer 
to passing the Turing test.
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EXPERT SYSTEMS
From the beginning, there were two basic ap-
proaches to artificial intelligence. 
The first was a top-down approach 
that connected a knowledge base to the 
rules of logical reasoning required for the 
specific domain within which it would be 
used. Basically, the computer would be pro-
grammed to reason just as a human would. 
For years, this was the basic means of au-
tomated language translation – including 
all the words and sets of grammatical rules 
from each language before entering a sen-
tence from one language and receiving an 
often-times imperfect translated sentence as 
output. 
This time-consuming approach to AI 
worked reasonably well in applications for 
which the environment was predictable 
and the rules were very clear, such as chess. 
There are a finite number of possible moves, 
the environment is predictable, and the rules 
are relatively simple. Even complex tasks 
such as analyzing certain laboratory test re-
sults to detect diseases were automated in 
the 1960s and performed better than junior 
doctors. 
These types of AI have also been referred 
to as expert systems because a subject matter 
expert – whether a grand master in chess or 
a medical doctor – must first provide all the 
necessary rules or guidelines for the AI and 
its “choices” are based on these predeter-
mined rules and logics. How well it performs 
becomes a matter of processor speeds and 
internal memory.
MACHINE LEARNING
The second approach was a bottom-up meth-
odology based on the evolutionary tendency 
in nature to build more complex systems 
from smaller simpler components. In this 
way, machines could learn in a manner simi-
lar to humans, through data collection and 
processing. Rather than a rigid, rules-based 
processing of expert systems, machine intel-
ligence could be flexible and adaptive like 
human intelligence. 
This bottom-up approach is referred to 
as “machine learning” and includes various 
techniques that, as Ilachinski described, “de-
tect patterns in, and learn and make predic-
tions from data.” 
One older bottom-up machine-learning 
technique that copies human biology has ex-
perienced a renaissance to become one of the 
leading AI approaches. Researchers in the 
1940s decided, naturally enough, that the hu-
man brain was itself a useful model on which 
to base machine intelligence. The brain, as 
Gideon Lewis-Kraus wrote in the New York 
Times:
Is just a bunch of widgets, called neurons, 
that either pass along an electrical charge 
to their neighbors or don’t. What’s im-
portant are less the individual neurons 
themselves than the manifold connections 
among them.… There was no reason you 
couldn’t try to mimic this structure in elec-
trical form, and in 1943 it was shown that 
arrangements of simple artificial neurons 
could carry out basic logical functions. They 
could also, at least in theory, learn the way 
we do.
DEEP LEARNING
These neural networks are one type of ma-
chine learning and, in a modernized and 
modified form called deep learning, is the 
technology behind AlphaGo and other ad-
vanced AI systems. Neural networks are 
learning models using layers of “neurons” 
to make predictions regarding an expected 
output based on identifying patterns in the 
input data. 
The neurons in the layers are assigned a 
weighted value and, if the value passes a par-
ticular threshold, it activates or “fires” in a 
manner similar to the brain. As Lewis-Kraus 
noted, “with one layer, you could find only 
simple patterns; with more than one, you 
could look for patterns of patterns.” Neural 
networks employ layer upon layer of neu-
rons, sifting through the input data and fine-
tuning the predictions that match that input 
with the desired output.
To “learn” a particular function; neural 
networks use training sets consisting of 
input-output pairings (giving, in other words, 
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the correct answer or appropriate output for 
the input) and assign the weighted values to 
induce the neurons in each layer to fire when 
part of the pattern in the data is recognized. 
BACKPROPAGATION
At the beginning, these weighted values be-
tween neurons may be random and, as James 
Somers described it, “it’s as if the synapses 
of the brain haven’t been tuned yet.” If the 
results are not entirely correct, the network 
can then move backwards among the layers 
preceding the final output layer in a method 
known as backpropagation or “backprop,” 
adjusting the weighted values. 
In this way, for example, a hand-written 
postal code can be scanned and each number 
analyzed by the neural network, with each 
layer of the network essentially “voting” or 
activating as the pixels making up the por-
tions of each number image are identified 
with the actual number. The more the system 
practices with training sets, the more ac-
curate and efficient the network becomes at 
finding the appropriate patterns among the 
data.
Incredibly, this system of recognizing pat-
terns in data was conceived in the 1940s and 
revisited again in the late 1980s with success 
at limited tasks such as playing backgam-
mon. When this breakthrough could not be 
replicated in other games such as chess or 
Go, however, neural network research fell 
dormant for over a decade. The advent of 
modern computer processing and the re-
integration of other types of learning algo-
rithms such as backpropagation enabled the 
current explosion in artificial intelligence 
applications and successes such as AlphaGo. 
ALPHAGO AND REINFORCEMENT 
LEARNING
Using a deep learning neural network, the 
DeepMind team fed a large training set of Go 
matches into the system, but also enabled 
AlphaGo to play thousands of simulated 
matches with itself, a process called rein-
forcement learning. In this way, the software 
constantly improved its play. The AI devel-
oped the ability to identify patterns in large 
data sets but also began to establish the 
foundation for machine decision-making.
Machine decision-making based on deep 
learning neural networks presents a new 
challenge. The methods by which the net-
work learns, adjusting and tweaking the 
predictive values in each layer, is something 
of a mysterious “black box” to humans. As 
MIT professor Tommi Jaakkola observed, “If 
you had a very small neural network, you 
might be able to understand it … but once 
it becomes very large, and it has thousands 
of units per layer and maybe hundreds of 
layers, then it becomes quite un-understand-
able.”  
A neural network left running overnight 
can “teach” itself French, but the engineers 
designing the applications cannot actually 
explain how this occurs. Other AI systems 
have been successfully used to identify pat-
terns in patient journals to predict diseases 
but cannot give any rationale for how it 
works. It just does. 
Chris Nicholson, founder of a deep learn-
ing start-up venture, explained that “people 
understand the linear algebra behind deep 
learning. But the models it produces are less 
human-readable. They’re machine readable.... 
They can retrieve very accurate results, but 
we can’t always explain, on an individual ba-
sis, what led them to those accurate results.” 
This may not be problematic for facial rec-
ognition or apps that suggest new movies or 
music selections. However, AI-assisted deci-
sion-making has become more common. To 
trust or verify the AI-generated conclusion 
or recommendation, it may be necessary to 
understand how that recommendation was 
formulated. This is particularly true for sys-
tems that can teach themselves without hu-
man supervision. Researchers have also been 
experimenting with AI machine-learning 
software that can code new AI software – AI 
creating new AI. 
THE AI EVOLUTION 
The technical evolution of AlphaGo is illus-
trative. After its success in South Korea, the 
DeepMind team improved and simplified the 
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software architecture, eventually launching 
a more powerful yet more efficient version 
called AlphaGo Zero that required a smaller 
computer system. Rather than utilizing train-
ing sets of human matches, AlphaGo Zero 
was given the rules and learned to play on its 
own by randomly placing the pieces on the 
board. 
The progress was staggering. After quickly 
advancing to the level of an amateur, AlphaGo 
Zero discovered certain tactics commonly 
employed by human players after the first 
day. It rose to a level comparable to a grand 
master after only three days, discovering new 
moves along the way that humans had not 
invented despite the game’s two-millennia-
long history. 
This ability to independently generate 
new knowledge without requiring access to 
previous human expertise is groundbreaking. 
AlphaGo Zero has a perfect record (100-0) 
against the older AlphaGo version that so 
resoundingly defeated Lee Sedol. As lead re-
searcher David Silver remarked, the system 
is more powerful because “by not using hu-
man data, or human expertise in any fashion, 
we’ve removed the constraints of human 
knowledge and it is able to create knowledge 
itself.”
COMPUTING POWER
Advances in AI have come about due to new 
methods and software architectures, but also 
because the pure computational power need-
ed for machine-learning techniques such as 
neural networks simply was not available. 
One innovator of neural networks, Geoffrey 
Hinton, recalled that “there just wasn’t 
enough computer power or enough data. 
People on our side kept saying ‘Yeah, but if I 
had a really big one, it would work.’ It wasn’t 
a very persuasive argument.” 
Eventually, however, the computers 
caught up with the demands of the tech-
nique. The evolution in computing power 
has accelerated dramatically. For nearly 
forty years (starting in the mid-1970s) the 
progression of computer processing power 
followed the prediction of Gordon Moore 
that the number of transistors on a micro-
chip – and therefore computer performance 
– roughly doubles every two years. Known 
as Moore’s Law, the pattern held true until 
about 2012, when microchip miniaturiza-
tion began to approach the physical limits of 
nanotechnology. 
The rapid improvements in computing 
power made it feasible to develop machine 
learning through neural networks and 
backprop. Computer processing (measured 
in computations per second) improved so 
dramatically that machine computational 
ability appears to be trending toward a level 
comparable with the human brain within the 
decade.
Inventor and Google research scientist 
Ray Kurtzweil has observed that technologi-
cal progress is evolutionary and builds upon 
previous advances. Kurtzweil argues that 
when barriers to technological advances 
emerge, new technologies will be developed 
to find ways around those barriers. 
COMPUTER CHIP EVOLUTION
The apparent end of Moore’s law provides an 
apt illustration. Alongside the development 
of new AI techniques, another revolution is 
occurring in microchip processors. Despite 
more efficient AI architectures, machine-
learning approaches such as neural networks 
normally have used graphics processing 
units (GPUs) originally intended for graph-
ics-heavy computer gaming. These require 
substantial computing power and therefore 
large amounts of energy. 
Several chip manufactures are experi-
menting with new “neuromorphic” computer 
chip that mirrors how the brain functions 
while using far less energy, a characteristic 
that will be particularly useful for AI applica-
tions. 
One of the fastest supercomputers, IBM’s 
Sequoia, consumes 7.9 megawatts of energy, 
whereas the human brain needs only 20 
watts. Using a network of 130,000 artificial 
neurons, the new Intel Loihi chip sends data 
by generating pulses of energy between the 
neurons, only using energy when those neu-
rons are activated in the same way the hu-
man brain does. The chip is self-learning and 
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could be useful for AI applications, but with 
much lower energy demands. 
The U.S. Department of Defense is funding 
a similar concept at IBM. The TrueNorth chip 
reportedly is particularly adept at parallel 
processing (running multiple applications 
simultaneously) and finding patterns in data 
in a way similar to human cognition. 
Google, which developed a similar type 
of chip several years ago, announced in 
February 2018 that it will allow other com-
panies access to their AI chip – which it calls 
tensor processing units (TPUs) – via a cloud 
computing solution. 
One potential application will be self-
driving vehicles. The current system under 
development requires days of training to 
enable the software to identify street signs 
or pedestrians. The new chips may reduce 
training time to mere hours. Convinced that 
driver assistance applications and self-driv-
ing vehicles are the future of the automotive 
business, manufacturers such as BMW and 
Volkswagen are also expanding into comput-
er technology and chip production. 
QUANTUM COMPUTING
Even more ambitious are efforts to harness 
the promise of quantum computing, technol-
ogy based on quantum physics or the study 
of how atomic and subatomic particles be-
have. 
Conventional computing is based on bi-
nary digits (or “bits”) which have a value of 
either zero or one. The value of these bits is 
transferred through the computer’s network 
using electrical impulses and light flashes, 
with network speeds usually measured in 
bits per second (or, given today’s high-speed 
data connections, in million (mega-) bits per 
second, Mbps). Bits themselves can carry 
logical information such as “on” or “off,” 
“true” or “false,” but more data can be held 
in a sequence of eight bits, which is called a 
byte.
In quantum computing, the basic unit is 
called a qubit and – rather than the ones and 
zeros of bits – can exist in multiple states si-
multaneously, allowing qubits to carry much 
more information. This in turn enables expo-
nentially faster computation speeds. 
In 2017, Volkswagen used a quantum 
computer from the Canadian manufacturer 
D-Wave to demonstrate how it optimized the 
movements of 10,000 taxis in Beijing simul-
taneously to avoid congestion and improve 
traffic flow. What would have taken a super-
computer 30 minutes was instead completed 
within a few seconds. 
Although the technology remains con-
troversial and its potential unclear, the pos-
sible applications for quantum computing 
are profound and would have immediate 
and fundamental implications, not just for 
artificial intelligence but also fields such as 
cryptography.
NARROW VERSUS GENERAL 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
Most applications of artificial intelligence, 
however impressive, are still relatively nar-
row in focus – identifying patterns or faces 
from large data sets, playing games such as 
chess or Go, operating a vehicle based on the 
rules of the road. 
As Andrew Ilachinski noted, “narrow AI” 
successes have two main characteristics. 
First, they “map fairly simple inputs to out-
puts”: an image recognition program receives 
an image as input and labels it a dog as out-
put, one language is entered into the trans-
lator and another emerges. Second, writes 
Ilachinski, “the time scales for human per-
formance (on the same set of specific prob-
lems) are fairly short,” meaning that the time 
needed to gather the information necessary 
to make a decision – whether it be a chess 
move or a driving maneuver – can usually be 
measured in seconds. 
Adapting AI from narrowly defined tasks 
to be useful in other contexts and across a 
broad range of input factors – in other words, 
moving from narrow AI to what is called 
artificial general intelligence or AGI – is still 
a long way off. Nevertheless, this is par-
tially the reason for the excitement around 
AlphaGo (not to mention AlphaGo Zero) – its 
ability to separate the learning and decision-
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making from the data set. It’s a system that 
taught itself to play Go, but the software will 
be able to teach itself many other applica-
tions as well, albeit still within a narrow and 
predictable context.
DEDUCTIVE, INDUCTIVE AND ABDUC-
TIVE REASONING
Building up a knowledge base and develop-
ing either consciousness or what we might 
call “common sense” remain a formidable 
challenge. One piece of the AGI puzzle is 
IBM’s Watson supercomputer and DeepQA, 
the AI architecture underpinning it. Using 
millions of documents downloaded into 
its memory, DeepQA crossed a significant 
threshold in 2011 when it was able to un-
derstand the verbal questions posed on the 
trivia game show Jeopardy. Watson reasoned 
its way to the answers using its information 
database, defeating the two best human play-
ers. 
Despite the impressive advances in ma-
chine-learning techniques, general artificial 
intelligence of the sort depicted in science 
fiction films is not yet visible and may not 
even be possible, let alone desirable.
Humans excel at adaptability in the face of 
unanticipated environmental stimuli and are 
usually able to quickly process and analyze 
new and unexpected information. Whereas 
computers are already superior in pure 
computational ability or deductive reason-
ing (applying general rules of logic to a set of 
data to reach correct conclusions about that 
data), the opposite (using individual observa-
tions to reach general principles or inductive 
reasoning) is much more difficult for AI, not 
to mention reaching explanations based on 
limited data points (or abductive reasoning). 
These skills separate a system that can sim-
ply recognize facts and situations from one 
that can actively apply reason to unforeseen 
situations. 
As Paul Allen, co-founder of Microsoft, ob-
served, “our systems have always remained 
‘brittle’ – their performance boundaries are 
rigidly set by their internal assumptions and 
defining algorithms, they cannot generalize, 
and they frequently give nonsensical answers 
outside of the specific focus areas.”
AI researchers note that computers are 
becoming more competent than humans 
at advanced computational functions but 
have yet to achieve the “common sense” of 
a child. It is therefore not surprising that 
DARPA sought funding in 2018 for research 
into programs that “create more human-like 
knowledge representations … to enable com-
monsense reasoning by machines about the 
physical world.” 
In February 2018, Allen announced a 
personal $125 million donation to develop 
AI “common sense,” in part by compiling a 
database of fundamental human knowledge 
computers lack. Until machines achieve su-
perintelligence, however, there are many ap-
plications for which narrow AI is more than 
adequate.
STRATEGIC USES FOR ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE 
Even though the driving force behind AI 
development is mainly in the civilian sector, 
military applications based on complex algo-
rithms for data analysis and pattern recogni-
tion are already widespread. The advantages 
of quickly analyzing large amounts of video 
or still images for intelligence purposes are 
obvious, but the possibilities go well beyond 
even these valuable tools. 
In this age of informational warfare, AI en-
ables video and audio forgeries. Augmented 
decision-making for combat systems has 
existed for decades, but AI is expected to 
further enhance the ability of machines to 
provide command and control support to 
military leaders on an increasingly complex 
and rapidly changing battlefield and do so in 
ways that will likely be superior to humans. 
And machines will increasingly be able to ef-
fectively control the weapons systems them-
selves, either individual platforms such as 
armed unmanned combat drones or swarms 
of such platforms. Even as AI investments 
expand, some practical applications are al-
ready visible.
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PREDICTIVE POLICING
In some American cities, police are using AI 
to predict criminal activity based on data 
analysis in a technique known as predic-
tive policing. Although police departments 
have mapped and analyzed crime patterns 
for decades using simpler methods such 
as pushpins on a wall map, they lacked the 
ability to react while the trends were unfold-
ing. Predictive algorithms analyze the data 
and predict geographical areas of particular 
concern down to within a single city block, 
giving police the ability to expand their pres-
ence in those areas. 
Similar analyses are being adapted for 
counterinsurgency – understanding and 
predicting future behavior based on patterns 
in the data. Researcher Paulo Shakarian has 
developed precisely this type of tool, which 
looked for patterns in the behavior of ISIS 
insurgents. As Shakarian related, “What we 
wanted to look for was: Are there relation-
ships amongst the actions the Islamic State 
does that leads to significant increases in 
activity?… When the violence increases that 
much, we want to understand why that is. We 
wanted to get insight into what led them to 
conduct certain military tactics.”
One of the largest commercial actors in 
the predictive policing market is the U.S. 
technology company Palantir, founded in 
2004 by a group of investors including bil-
lionaire Peter Thiel, and nurturing close ties 
to defense and intelligence agencies. Using 
complex algorithms and “big data,” Palantir 
sells analytic software meant to provide real-
time analyses of a wide-ranging database 
including information. Its customers include 
some of the largest police departments in the 
U.S., although the partnership has not always 
gone smoothly. 
In 2017, the Norwegian Customs 
Directorate signed a 300 million kroner con-
tract with Palantir to provide AI-based data 
analysis that combines information from oth-
er databases including NAV (the Norwegian 
Labor and Welfare Administration), govern-
ment property registers and information 
from open internet sources. For instance, a 
car’s registration plate can be automatically 
photographed at the border and information 
about its owner is then cross-referenced with 
data from the Customs Directorate and cer-
tain external databases. The data is then ana-
lyzed by AI algorithms to identify and predict 
patterns of potential criminal activity.
IMAGE RECOGNITION FOR ISR
Advances in image recognition AI algorithms 
have expedited intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR) imagery, particularly 
from unmanned aerial vehicles. With the 
advent of persistent overhead ISR came an 
overwhelming amount of data to send back 
for analysts to sift though. As one top mili-
tary leader commented, “today an analyst 
sits there and stares at Death TV for hours 
on end, trying to find the single target or see 
something move. It’s just a waste of man-
power.” 
Onboard algorithms are already being 
used to conduct a preliminary filtering to 
reduce the terabytes of data transmitted 
back for analysis, reducing bandwidth re-
quirements. On the ground, the U.S. military 
employs AI neural networks to assist in video 
analysis. Not only can the software process 
far greater amounts of data in far less time 
than human analysts, it is becoming more 
effective as well.  In a 2015 competition, 
machine-learning software developed by 
Microsoft and Google outperformed humans 
at image recognition. 
In 2017, the Air Force took the next logi-
cal step and created the Algorithmic Warfare 
Cross Functional Team – also known as 
Project Maven – focused on using AI to ac-
celerate image analysis. Combined with geo-
spatial software, targets can be identified and 
tracked over time.  With improvements to 
machine learning, the application is scalable 
– starting with smaller images from tactical 
drones and adapting the technology to larger 
sensors such as an MQ-9 Reaper drone with a 
Gorgon Stare sensor able to provide coverage 
of an entire city. Eventually, processing and 
analysis of satellite feeds for daily global im-
age analysis will be possible.
The power of AI to assist ground forces 
in tactical reconnaissance, particularly in 
Introduction to Artificial Intelligence
© Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, Oslo 2018. ISSN 1894-4795
IFS Insights 4/2018 10
counterterrorism or counterinsurgency 
operations, is already being demonstrated.  
Chinese officials recently revealed a new sys-
tem that connects police on the street wear-
ing camera-equipped sunglasses with facial 
recognition software and a centralized crimi-
nal database, giving them almost instant ac-
cess to an individual’s personal information. 
Airport immigration and customs officials 
in Europe and elsewhere are employing bio-
metric facial recognition for passenger iden-
tification.
INCREASED ABILITY TO FALSIFY
The advent of reliable image recognition 
technology has also given rise to software 
to reverse engineer those images. As Greg 
Allen has argued, “in our society, audio and 
video recordings serve as the final arbiter of 
truth.” One Canadian startup company has 
developed AI-driven technology that can 
produce audio mimicking anyone’s voice – 
the company’s demo uses Donald Trump, 
Barack Obama, and Hillary Clinton – with 
surprising realism. Software maker Adobe 
has announced a similar effort heralded as 
“Photoshop for audio.” 
The ability to falsify extends to video as 
well. Stanford researchers used AI-based 
software to change – in real time – the facial 
expressions of individuals in YouTube videos. 
Even more startling is an ability to run image 
recognition software in reverse, creating syn-
thetic images based solely on a text descrip-
tion. 
One researcher involved in the effort, Jeff 
Clune, revealed that “people send me real 
images and I start to wonder if they look 
fake. And when they send me fake images I 
assume they’re real because the quality is so 
good.” 
In an age of information warfare, the abil-
ity to convincingly falsify audio and video 
could be a powerful weapon to retain plau-
sible deniability or generate false claims to 
justify a military intervention. Allen warned 
in an online piece aptly titled “AI will make 
forging anything entirely too easy” that un-
less this challenge is met, “we will have to 
live in a society where there is no ultimate 
arbiter of truth.”
MACHINE LEARNING FOR WEAPONS 
SYSTEMS
Not only is artificial intelligence creating new 
capabilities through pattern recognition and 
image manipulation, machine-learning tech-
niques are improving the decision-making 
ability of existing automated weapons sys-
tems and enabling new possibilities for the 
control of military platforms. 
The Aegis Combat System first installed 
aboard U.S. Navy ships in 1984 is an inte-
grated command and control system able 
to independently identify, track, and engage 
targets. It has four settings with varying de-
grees of human control, ranging from “semi-
automatic” in which the ship’s personnel use 
the system to assist in target prioritization) 
to a so-called “casualty mode” setting where 
it is assumed that the crew can no longer 
make any command decisions and the ship 
autonomously identifies, tracks, and engages 
targets. 
With the advent of machine learning, this 
already extremely capable decision-making 
software might be vastly improved – con-
stantly evaluating its own performance and 
finding unique tactical solutions much in the 
same way that AlphaGo Zero discovered new 
tactics for the board game.
AUTONOMOUS PLATFORMS
For individual platforms, AI will enable au-
tonomous modes that extends beyond sim-
ply operation of the vehicle itself. Similar to 
Tesla’s autopilot or Google’s self-driving cars, 
the U.S. military has already experimented 
with autonomous vehicle convoys for supply-
ing troops in dangerous terrain without put-
ting human drivers at risk. 
Onboard computer systems have assisted 
pilots in flying aircraft since the advent of 
“fly-by-wire” technology decades ago. Among 
the innovations of the new F-35 fighter air-
craft is the onboard integrated sensor and 
weapons system software that collects and 
processes large amounts of data and displays 
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it on the pilot’s helmet. In addition to manag-
ing onboard flight systems, the aircraft’s soft-
ware can independently identify and track 
multiple targets, allowing the pilot to focus 
on tactical decision-making. 
Given the advances in processing speed 
and lower power requirements of newer AI 
computer chips, it seems likely that the next 
generation fighter aircraft will not only be 
capable of operating the aircraft and analyz-
ing relevant sensor information, but also of 
performing the tactical decision-making. 
In 2016, an AI application created by 
a doctoral student at the University of 
Cincinnati soundly defeated retired Air Force 
Colonel Gene Lee, an experienced fighter pi-
lot with significant operative and simulator 
experience. The AI divided its larger tasks 
into smaller ones such as target tracking, 
firing weapons, or defensive maneuvers. In 
this way, it continually focused on only the 
most relevant tasks, which sped up tactical 
decision-making and reduced computational 
requirements. 
Using an inexpensive Raspberry Pi com-
puter, the efficient AI software consistently 
found the best tactical solutions. Drained 
after hours-long sessions against the first AI 
to regularly beat a human pilot in a simulator, 
Lee commented that “I was surprised at how 
aware and reactive it was.… It seemed to be 
aware of my intentions and reacting instantly 
to my changes in flight and missile deploy-
ment. It knew how to defeat the shot I was 
taking. It moved instantly between defensive 
and offensive actions as needed.”
AUTONOMOUS SWARMS
Control over individual platforms in complex 
environments will soon extend to control 
over groups or “swarms” of individual plat-
forms functioning as a network, particularly 
in the air or at sea. These systems need not 
carry weapons to have a significant strategic 
impact. 
As Edward Moore Geist points out: Most 
nuclear powers base the security of their 
deterrent on the assumption that missile-
carrying submarines will remain difficult for 
enemies to locate, but relatively inexpensive 
AI-controlled undersea drones may make the 
seas “transparent” in the not-too-distant fu-
ture. The geostrategic consequences of such 
a development are unpredictable and could 
be catastrophic.
Successful tests involving large numbers 
of smaller drones – both in the air and at sea 
– suggest that future battlefields will have AI-
controlled autonomous swarms monitored 
by human commanders, but with individual 
unit-level control coordinated by machines. 
Clearly, this will have dramatic implications 
for command and control decision loops. 
As one officer commented to author Peter 
Singer, “the trend towards the future will be 
robots reacting to robot attack, especially 
when acting at technologic speed ... as the 
loop gets shorter and shorter, there won’t be 
any time in it for humans.” 
GREAT POWER AI ARMS RACE
If these developments are any indication of 
the future strategic environment, AI will play 
a pivotal role as an enabling capability. As the 
authors of a 2017 report speculated, “many 
actors will face increasing temptation to del-
egate greater levels of authority to a machine, 
or else face defeat,” noting that Russian au-
thorities have “approved an aggressive plan 
that would have 30% of Russian combat 
power consist of entirely remote-controlled 
and autonomous robotic platforms by 2030.” 
In the wake of AlphaGo’s success in 2016, 
South Korea announced that it would invest 
nearly US$1 billion over a five-year period 
on civilian public-private partnerships for AI 
research and development. The success of 
AlphaGo reportedly also convinced Chinese 
military leaders of the capacity of AI to think 
and act strategically. China appears ready to 
apply AI and autonomy not only to individual 
weapon systems but also military command 
and control decision-making. 
This AI focus is matched by the Pentagon’s 
“Third Offset Strategy,” an initiative aimed 
at recapturing the U.S. technological advan-
tage on the battlefield. As Deputy Secretary 
of Defense Robert Work explained in a 2016 
speech, the U.S. has since the 1950s sought 
“ways in which to offset our potential ad-
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versary’s advantages.” To offset the Soviet 
conventional superiority, the First Offset 
Strategy emphasized tactical nuclear weap-
ons for which the “technological sauce” was 
the miniaturization of nuclear components. 
After the Soviets reached strategic parity 
and conventional deterrence seemed less 
credible, the Second Offset Strategy focused 
on precision-guided munitions and network 
warfare, enabled this time by a technological 
sauce that included computers, sensors, and 
stealth. 
These advantages have now been lost due 
to the proliferation of precision-guided mu-
nitions and anti-access/area denial capabili-
ties. According to Work, American military 
leaders “believe quite strongly that the tech-
nological sauce of the Third Offset is going to 
be advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and 
autonomy,” noting that “competitors that can 
use AI and autonomy in a smart way are go-
ing to be the competitors that have a very big 
operational advantage in the future.” Russian 
president Vladimir Putin described the cur-
rent situation in a more dramatic fashion: 
“artificial intelligence is the future, not only 
of Russia, but of all of mankind ... Whoever 
becomes the leader in this sphere will be-
come the ruler of the world.” 
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The explosive growth in computing power 
coupled with global connectivity via the 
Internet has irrevocably altered social in-
teractions and, therefore, the strategic land-
scape. Within a generation, a rudimentary 
network connecting a few American univer-
sities has evolved into an integrated and om-
nipresent part of the human experience as 
something we now call cyberspace. 
Perhaps the most intriguing and conse-
quential aspect of the digital realm is how 
far it actually penetrates. The interconnected 
devices range from national power grids 
to individual telephones, automobiles and 
household thermostats. This range and the 
sheer geographic and numerical breadth of 
interconnected devices shows how pervasive 
it already has become. The horizontal and 
vertical reach of cyber threats make them 
strategic in nature, but the ability to launch 
cyber attacks rests with a wide range of ac-
tors, from individuals to corporations to na-
tion states. Cyberspace as we know it today 
is only a few decades old, and it is rife with 
competing forces.
DEFINING CYBERSPACE
Cyberspace has been designated the fifth op-
erational domain of warfare, alongside land, 
air, sea, and outer space. Unlike the other 
four domains, however, cyberspace is con-
structed entirely by humans. While technical 
definitions abound, one helpful way to visu-
alize and define cyberspace is to divide it into 
three layers. 
As Martin Libicki explains, the first 
layer is a physical one and includes all the 
hardware components of cyberspace such 
as computers, smart phones, routers, and 
cables. 
On this rests a second layer, the syntactic 
level containing the instructions that allow 
these machines to function and the protocols 
that enable communication between them. 
The third and final layer is the semantic 
layer – all the information stored on the 
computer itself. Some of this information is, 
as Libicki notes, “semantic in form but syn-
tactic in nature” (information stored on the 
computer but providing instructions for the 
machine such as a printer driver, or software 
which controls machinery) while much of 
semantic layer is “natural language” informa-
tion such as documents or spreadsheet. 
For example, uploading a picture from a 
smartphone to the “cloud” involves the physi-
cal layer (the phone itself, the mobile tower 
sending and receiving signals, and the serv-
er/storage unit providing cloud storage), the 
syntactic layer (the phone’s operating system 
and apps used to take the picture and con-
nect with the cloud), and the semantic layer 
(the file containing the picture itself).
INTERNET OF THINGS
This layered structure, apart from being 
conceptually useful when specifying the na-
ture and targets of threats in cyberspace, is 
simply one of the unique aspects of the cyber 
domain. 
The networked nature of cyberspace con-
nects a vast array of devices. This so-called 
“Internet of Things” (or IoT) is by one esti-
mate expected to reach 34 billion devices by 
2020 and includes personal computers and 
smart phones, as well as household products 
Cyberspace has become a domain characterized by permanent conflict, filled with 
rapidly evolving threats and a wide range of strategic actors.
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such as televisions, thermostats, refrigera-
tors, and personal fitness bands. 
It also includes corporate and military 
networks and national infrastructure such 
as electrical grids and energy pipelines. 
Information stored on these interconnected 
devices can be shared or stolen from the oth-
er side of the globe, and in ways that ensure 
anonymity. Much of the infrastructure of cy-
berspace is privately owned, and many of the 
most powerful actors are not nation-states. 
The breadth and depth of cyberspace 
makes it an exceptionally complex and chal-
lenging domain for military-related security 
operations. Certain qualities of the Internet 
itself make the network particularly vul-
nerable. Data is routed by servers through 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) which can 
be re-routed or disturbed either by attack-
ing the server itself or the Domain Name 
System (DNS), which is the protocol and in-
frastructure connecting domain names (such 
as forsvaret.no) to their numbered Internet 
Protocol (IP) addresses. 
In addition, much of what makes the in-
ternet function is decentralized, unregulated, 
and unencrypted, providing a perfect envi-
ronment for low-level individual disruption 
or sophisticated and coordinated attacks on 
information infrastructures.
GAINING ACCESS
There are both internal and external meth-
ods of gaining access to a computer system, 
although the internal causes are much less 
common. Among these are insider threats 
from rogue employees – an Edward Snowden 
scenario, for example – or inadvertently 
through poor cyber “hygiene.” 
One well-known example of this occurred 
in 2008, when a soldier at a U.S. military base 
picked up a flash drive purposely left by a 
foreign intelligence agency in the parking 
lot outside and inserted it into a computer 
connected to the U.S. Central Command, in-
advertently uploading harmful software. The 
subsequent cyber breach, an incident that 
became known as Buckshot Yankee, required 
over a year of work to clean and repair ma-
chines on the network. 
Another way threats can access a system 
is through the supply chain. A famous histori-
cal example is the thousands of World War 
Two Enigma machines Britain had captured 
from the Germans and later distributed to 
their former colonies, who then assumed 
their encrypted messages remained secure 
but could, in fact, be read by the British. 
A modern version is the tens of thousands 
of counterfeit Chinese-manufactured com-
puter chips – about 59,000 were discovered 
in 2010 alone – ending up in U.S. military 
weapons systems that could potentially 
cause computers to crash or missiles to 
malfunction. According to a 2014 Pentagon 
report, a cybersecurity test of 40 weapon 
systems revealed “significant vulnerabili-
ties” in all of them, while a German-operated 
Patriot missile defense system was report-
edly hacked in 2015.
HACKING IN A VARIETY OF FORMS
Externally gaining unauthorized access to 
a computer or computer network – what is 
commonly referred to as hacking – can take 
a variety of forms as well. A relatively simple 
way to gain access is through “phishing,” a 
technique whereby legitimate-looking emails 
are sent with a corrupted attachment in the 
hope that the unsuspecting victim will down-
load it. Alternatively, the email may provide a 
link to a website that either facilitates harm-
ful code to be downloaded or encourages the 
target to enter sensitive information. 
A more advanced technique called “spear 
phishing” uses information about a specific 
individual to create emails that look particu-
larly convincing. During its annual cyberse-
curity test, the Norwegian Security Agency 
(NSM) found in 2017 that 90% of public em-
ployees clicked on the NSM’s phishing email 
link, half of those respondents actually acti-
vated the simulated malware, and one third 
even provided user names and passwords for 
their respective networks.
Another means of gaining entry is through 
a software vulnerability embedded in the 
system at the syntactic level among the mil-
lions of lines of operating system code.  
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TYPES OF VULNERABILITIES
The types of vulnerabilities and how they are 
exploited vary. One broad category detailed 
by Peter Singer and Alan Friedman is the 
SQL (pronounced sequel) injection, which 
affects the Structured Query Language (SQL) 
often used in web applications: “an attacker, 
instead of entering a name and address as 
requested, can enter specifically crafted com-
mands that the database will read and inter-
pret as program code, rather than just data to 
be stored.” In this way, hackers can access the 
data or gain control over the website. 
Another class of vulnerability is the buf-
fer overflow, which occurs when a program 
attempts to write more data to an allotted 
block of memory (called a buffer) and in-
stead overwrites data in adjacent “overflow” 
storage areas. Exploiting this process by 
inserting lines of code to be written into the 
computer’s memory can allow an intruder 
to gain control at the system level. A piece of 
code written to take advantage of a specific 
vulnerability is called an “exploit,” which 
can then be transferred, sold, or saved until 
needed.
Clearly, vulnerabilities embedded in soft-
ware code – intentional or not – are valu-
able resources, and not only for criminal 
networks, activist hackers (“hacktivists”), or 
state-funded groups. The National Security 
Agency (NSA), which has an elite hacking 
group formerly known as the Tailored Access 
Operations office (TAO), buys and collects 
vulnerabilities from other hackers. According 
to journalist Shane Harris, the NSA even pays 
software companies not to repair or an-
nounce vulnerabilities so that NSA hackers 
can exploit them. 
Other classified documents show that “the 
NSA invites makers of encryption products 
to let the agency’s experts review their work, 
with the ostensible goal of making their algo-
rithms stronger. But the NSA actually inserts 
vulnerabilities into the products to use in its 
espionage and cyber warfare missions.” 
“ZERO DAY”
No vulnerability is quite as valuable as a 
“zero day,” meaning the attack utilizes a “net 
new” previously unknown vulnerability 
and therefore occurs on the zeroth day it 
is known to the rest of the world. Its value 
comes in large part from the element of 
surprise, but the vulnerability is usually a 
“one-time only” opportunity as the target is 
likely to patch it once the intrusion has been 
discovered. 
The NSA builds most of their own cyber 
weapons, but also has a substantial budget 
– about $25 million in 2013 – to purchase 
zero-day exploits. According to Harris, “the 
NSA is widely believed by security experts 
and government officials to be the single 
largest procurer of zero-day exploits, many of 
which it buys in a shadowy online bazaar of 
freelance hackers and corporate middlemen.” 
Several private companies sell zero-day vul-
nerabilities through a subscription plan and 
even offer a catalogue of ready-made zero-
day exploits for sale. 
Whether intruders gain access through 
phishing, vulnerabilities, or built-in back-
doors in software, the goal is oftentimes 
to insert a ready-made exploit known as 
malicious software (or malware) into the 
system, usually delivering a “payload” of 
harmful code. Examples of these might be a 
virus (self-replicating programs that attach 
themselves to other software and often mo-
nopolize available memory, paralyzing the 
infected computer) or a “Trojan horse” that 
appears to be a benign program but hides 
harmful code.  
One common payload is a “worm” that 
can self-replicate, use memory, and spread 
throughout the network. These need not 
necessarily be malicious – the first known 
instance was the 1988 Morris Worm, whose 
creator claimed intended only to measure the 
size of the Internet but infected thousands 
of computers and caused their operating 
systems to slow down to the point of dys-
function. One of the most expensive was the 
ILOVEYOU worm which spread worldwide 
during one day in May 2000, ultimately in-
fecting 45 million computers running the 
Windows operating system and costing an 
estimated $10 billion in damage. 
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ADVANCED PERSISTENT THREAT
A particularly challenging category of threat 
incorporating several methods of access and 
multiple exploits is the Advanced Persistent 
Threat (APT), which describes a focused and 
concerted effort to gain access to specific 
targets. The often state-sponsored attackers 
use any number of advanced hacking tech-
niques such as spear phishing and zero-day 
exploits, and are persistent in their efforts to 
penetrate a network’s defenses. 
Much of the current APT activity has been 
linked to Russian groups, particularly ones 
suspected of receiving state funding, but 
Chinese hackers have also been particularly 
active. In the U.S. context, notes Shane Harris, 
“when government officials mention ‘APT’ to-
day, what they often mean is China, and more 
specifically, hackers working at the direction 
of Chinese military and intelligence officials 
or on their behalf.” 
COMPUTER NETWORK EXPLOITATION
Once the cyber intruders have gained access, 
they can either steal information or cause 
damage either in the cyber realm or in the 
physical world. Hacking to steal information 
is also called computer network exploitation 
(CNE), using malware (or, more aptly, “spy-
ware”) to record keystrokes to discover pass-
words, view e-mails sent, websites visited, or 
even enable the exfiltration of sensitive data. 
Richard Clarke and Robert Knake de-
scribed how, for example, Canadian re-
searchers in 2009 discovered sophisticated 
malware they named “GhostNet” present 
on over a thousand computers at a number 
of countries’ embassies around the world. 
The program was able to activate remotely a 
computer’s camera and microphone, sending 
back the audio and video to servers in China. 
It is widely believed that Chinese hack-
ers also repeatedly breached the computer 
networks of Pentagon defense contractors 
responsible for developing the advanced 
F-35 stealth fighter aircraft, stealing design 
plans that likely formed the basis for China’s 
own J-20 stealth fighter. The theft forced pro-
grammers to re-write large portions of the 
software code. 
A Russian-linked hacker group desig-
nated APT 28 (also known as Fancy Bear), is 
suspected of repeatedly infiltrating govern-
ment computer networks and stealing data, 
including networks belonging to the German 
parliament in 2015, the U.S. Democratic 
Party headquarters in 2016, and the German 
foreign ministry in 2018.
The United States has been active in cyber 
espionage. As the New York Times reported, 
“the N.S.A. has embraced hacking as an es-
pecially productive way to spy on foreign 
targets. The intelligence collection is often 
automated, with malware implants — com-
puter code designed to find material of inter-
est — left sitting on the targeted system for 
months or even years, sending files back to 
the N.S.A.” 
Ironically, the NSA itself is not entirely 
safe from theft as it discovered in 2016 when 
a mysterious group calling themselves the 
Shadow Brokers infiltrated the agency and 
stole highly classified data and advanced cy-
berweapons.
INDUSTRY ESPIONAGE AND HACK-
BACKS
While governments remain attractive targets 
for CNE efforts by other state actors as well 
as non-state groups, there is also a significant 
amount of activity at the corporate level. 
Online industry espionage, damaging mal-
ware, and criminal activities cost the private 
sector huge sums of money. 
Many are preparing to fight back by en-
listing the help of former defense and intel-
ligence service veterans who have gone into 
the lucrative cybersecurity business. One 
such firm is CrowdStrike, which will create 
lookalike networks for their corporate clients 
to lure in hackers (so-called “honeypots” 
or, in this case, “honeynets”), thus revealing 
what intruders are looking for and the tech-
niques used. 
Active retaliation after a cyber intrusion 
or “hack-backs” is illegal in the U.S. In 2013, 
however, Microsoft joined forces with a 
group of financial institutions to do precisely 
that. Its target was a notorious cybercrime 
group called the Citadel which had used 
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thousands of infected computers as botnets 
to infiltrate bank networks to steal credit 
card information. 
After receiving permission from the U.S. 
justice system, Microsoft launched a long, 
complex, and ultimately successful counter 
cyberattack to gather information on their 
attackers that involved law enforcement 
agencies in over 80 countries. According to 
Harris, banks have been collecting zero-day 
vulnerabilities and exploits to retaliate in 
case of a massive cyberattack.
COMPUTER NETWORK ATTACK
Unauthorized network access can also be 
motivated by even more nefarious intentions 
that cause disruption to the network, exten-
sive corruption of systems or data, and even 
damage in the physical realm. These actions 
cross the somewhat arbitrary threshold from 
CNE to CNA (computer network attacks). 
A malware designed to affect computers 
by locking operating systems or threatening 
to erase data unless the owner sends pay-
ment (often in the online currency Bitcoin) 
is called ransomware. In May 2017, ransom-
ware called “Wannacry” spread across the 
globe, seriously affecting networks such as 
those of the British national health service, 
Indian police departments and a Spanish 
telecom company. 
Attributed by some (the United States 
and Britain) to North Korea, Wannacry used 
a Windows vulnerability called EternalBlue. 
This was one of the NSA’s most valuable 
hacking tools, reportedly stolen when the 
mysterious Shadow Brokers group breached 
the NSA’s own network. 
Not only did the Shadow Brokers release 
the vulnerability, it also released a pre-made 
exploit for EternalBlue which was then re-
tooled and paired with a worm to make 
Wannacry particularly invasive. Microsoft 
president Brad Smith compared the theft 
to “the U.S. military having some of its 
Tomahawk missiles stolen.” The NSA notified 
Microsoft after discovering the theft, which 
then released a patch to address the vulner-
ability.
BOTNET VIRUSES
Other malware takes control of part of a 
user’s computer – often without them even 
realizing it – and using it as part of an auto-
mated yet coordinated attack of “botnets.” A 
bot is simply an application that performs an 
automated task (Apple’s Siri is a bot), so that 
a botnet is a network of computers function-
ing as bots toward a common goal. 
In 2009, it is believed that North Korean 
hackers launched a coordinated attack us-
ing a botnet virus. Over 40,000 comput-
ers around the world began sending page 
requests to certain U.S. and South Korean 
servers. The flood of traffic reached the 
level of over 1 million requests per second, 
temporarily bringing down the web serv-
ers of the U.S. Treasury, Secret Service, U.S. 
Trade Commission, and the Department of 
Transportation. The distributed denial of 
service (DDOS) attack reached its peak a few 
days later as 166,000 computers in 74 coun-
tries flooded South Korean bank and govern-
ment agency websites. 
Two years earlier, Russian hackers were 
most likely responsible for the DDOS attack 
in Estonia that is often referred to as the first 
major instance of a state-sponsored cyber at-
tack. The incident temporarily paralyzed the 
banking sector, national newspapers, and on-
line government services. The botnet worm 
used in the attack was so pervasive that over 
a million computers were flooding Estonian 
servers with page requests.
One of the largest botnet DDOS attacks 
occurred on 21 October 2016, targeting Dyn, 
a company that controls a significant por-
tion of the Internet’s domain name system 
infrastructure, with a unique botnet. Instead 
of using computers, the Mirai botnet infected 
and harnessed smaller devices comprising 
the Internet of Things, including routers and 
security cameras that have limited cyber-
security features. The result was a massive 
1.2 Terabyte per second attack that over-
whelmed Dyn servers and disrupted web-
sites such as Twitter, the Guardian, Netflix, 
and CNN.
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DESTRUCTION
In addition to disruption, cyber attackers 
can also cause significant and irreparable 
damage to computer networks and stored 
data. In December 2011, the hacktivist group 
Anonymous gained access to the security 
analysis company Stratfor through its web-
site, stealing employee emails and the per-
sonal records and credit card information for 
60,000 customers. 
Afterwards, the hackers managed to “ef-
fectively destroy” four Stratfor servers con-
taining years of the company’s analytical 
data and reports – the core of the company’s 
business. Jeremy Hammond, the hacktivist 
convicted of the crime, later explained that 
“first you deface, the you take the informa-
tion, then you destroy the server ... so they 
can’t rebuild the system. We don’t want them 
to rebuild. And to destroy forensic evidence 
that could be used to find out who did it and 
how it was done.” 
Cyber attacks affecting critical military 
systems can be used in conjunction with a 
conventional attack, as the Israelis demon-
strated in September 2007 during what be-
came known as “Operation Orchard”: When 
a laptop belonging to a Syrian official was 
hacked by Israeli agents during 2006 and the 
information exfiltrated, they discovered evi-
dence of a secret plutonium processing plant 
in Syria being constructed with assistance 
from North Korea. 
This led to seven Israeli F-15s crossing 
into Syrian airspace on 6 September 2007 
and bombing the facility in question without 
detection by a single anti-aircraft battery. As 
Singer and Friedman describe, “the Israelis 
had successfully penetrated the Syrian mili-
tary’s computer network, allowing them to 
see what the Syrians were doing as well as 
direct their own data streams into the air de-
fense network. This caused the Syrian radar 
operators to see a false image of what was 
really happening.” 
STUXNET
One example of a cyber attack using mal-
ware to cause actual physical damage is 
the Stuxnet virus. Usually attributed to the 
United States and Israel, it is perhaps the 
most well-known and most sophisticated 
cyber attack to date and often considered the 
first real use of cyber weapon. 
The target, Iran’s uranium enrichment 
facility at Natanz, used thousands of centri-
fuges connected to computers known as pro-
grammable logic controllers which manage 
their operation.  Although the network was 
not connected to the internet, careless use 
of flash drives by some employees may have 
provided an opening. A software “beacon” 
was installed that sent back details on the 
centrifuges, followed by a complex piece of 
malware that was constructed and inserted 
into the facility’s network. 
The worm (later named Stuxnet by 
Microsoft based on a combination of file 
names in the malware) first recorded signals 
on the network indicating normal centrifuge 
operation. Then, while playing back the “all 
systems normal” signals, began to disrupt 
the centrifuges by spinning them too fast or 
suddenly applying the brake. The Iranians 
became distrustful of their own instruments 
as up to several thousand of the 8,700 centri-
fuges were ruined and needed to be replaced 
within a few short months during 2010. 
The Stuxnet worm eventually found its 
way onto the Internet, however, and versions 
of it soon surfaced around the world. A team 
of cyber security specialists at Symantec be-
gan analyzing the malware and immediately 
found its complexity and sophistication sus-
picious. The code utilized previously unseen 
techniques and multiple “zero day” exploits, 
prompting some to declare it “the most com-
plex malware ever written.” 
INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEMS
Critical public and private infrastructure, 
from pipelines to power grids and waste 
treatment plants, is also managed by similar 
industrial control systems (ICS). The largest 
subset of these are supervisory control and 
data acquisition (SCADA) systems that moni-
tor and control flows and remotely perform 
system diagnostics. The networked nature of 
these systems and the uneven protection of 
the many smaller private regional companies 
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make them particularly vulnerable to cyber 
intrusions and attacks. 
A type of software code that can be plant-
ed in a computer network is sometimes re-
ferred to as a “logic bomb.” This is code that 
can lie dormant in a system but once activat-
ed causes the computer to damage or destroy 
data, its own hardware, or even physical sys-
tems connected to those data networks. 
One of the first alleged uses of this osten-
sibly occurred when the Soviet Union, eager 
to acquire commercial technology for its oil 
and gas industry during the 1980s, stole code 
from a Canadian firm producing industrial 
control systems that governed the operation 
of pipeline pumps and valves. The Central 
Intelligence Agency had anticipated the theft, 
however, and had planted malware in the 
code. Initially, the technology installed on the 
Trans-Siberian gas pipeline operated nor-
mally but eventually started to intentionally 
malfunction, increasing the pump’s pressure 
in one section while simultaneously closing a 
valve at the other end. The subsequent three 
kiloton explosion in June 1982 was the larg-
est non-nuclear blast ever recorded. 
NORWEGIAN OIL AND GAS
These types of industrial targets have be-
come even more vulnerable as industrial 
control systems software becomes more 
widespread and more capable. In Norway, 
unsecured network servers controlling 
industrial processes at Statoil’s Mongstad 
refinery led to a temporary production 
halt when outsourced data consultants in 
India conducting remote data maintenance 
mistakenly gained access to the servers. 
Investigative reporting discovered 29 similar 
instances of accidental breaches. 
The ability of actors to exploit digital vul-
nerabilities within private Norwegian oil and 
gas infrastructure was recently analyzed in 
a comprehensive report by the Norwegian 
Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), 
which outlined how public-private partner-
ships could contribute to more resilient net-
works. 
In 2017, hackers possibly linked to Iran 
breached the networks of the world’s larg-
est oil company, Saudi Aramco, depositing 
a piece of malware called “Triton” that at-
tempted to alter the emergency shutdown 
system at one of Aramco’s facilities. The at-
tack ultimately failed and the malware was 
discovered. 
In one case, industrial vulnerability had 
very real consequences. A German steel 
mill fell prey to a sophisticated cyber attack 
in 2014 that hindered the ability of a blast 
furnace to perform a controlled shut down, 
causing massive damage. 
VULNERABLE INFRASTRUCTURE
The vulnerability of computer networks 
upon which modern society depends has 
not been lost on policy-makers. President 
Obama announced in May 2009 that “cyber 
intruders have probed our electrical grid 
and that in other countries cyber attacks 
have plunged entire cities into darkness.” 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Michael 
Mullen acknowledged in 2011 that “the ef-
fects of a well-coordinated, state-sponsored 
cyber-attack against our financial, transpor-
tation, communications, and energy systems 
would be catastrophic.” 
In 2015 and again in 2016, Ukraine suf-
fered attacks to its energy infrastructure 
via a malware package called BlackEnergy. 
It included an additional component called 
Killdisk which together destroyed computer 
hard drives, sabotaged control systems, and 
was able to send commands directly to criti-
cal power grid control systems. The cyber 
attack left several hundred thousand people 
without electricity for several hours. 
The head of Britain’s cyber security cen-
ter, Ciaran Martin, stated in 2017 that Russia 
had penetrated the country’s energy and 
telecommunications sectors. Similarly, the 
Trump administration announced in March 
2018 that Russian hackers had infiltrated U.S. 
and European power plants and electrical 
grids, ostensibly achieving the ability to ma-
nipulate or shut down power plants. 
After reviewing the evidence from the 
Russian intrusions, Eric Chien from the cy-
bersecurity firm Symantec concluded that 
“they’re sitting on the machines, connected 
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to industrial control infrastructure, that al-
low them to effectively turn the power off or 
effect sabotage … all that’s missing is some 
political motivation.” In effect, noted PwC cy-
bersecurity expert Brad Bauch, the intrusion 
was “a supply-chain attack vector … A soft-
ware company was attacked, and malware 
was then injected into the software that a lot 
of companies use.”
STRATEGIC ASPECTS OF CYBER POWER
Given the features of cyberspace, how might 
states act strategically within this domain 
and across all domains? This question goes 
beyond simply ensuring that national net-
works and digital infrastructure are secure, 
although cybersecurity is a crucial part of 
any comprehensive approach to cyberspace. 
This section will address cyber power, 
which has been defined as “the ability to use 
cyberspace to create advantages and influ-
ence events in the other operational environ-
ments and across the instruments of power.” 
In other words, how can offensive and de-
fensive capabilities in cyberspace be used by 
state militaries such as Norway or the United 
States within that domain and across the 
other military domains to defend, attack, de-
ter, or coerce?
Despite the declaration by the United 
States and its NATO allies that cyberspace 
constitutes the fifth domain of warfare, there 
are clearly significant differences between 
it and the other domains. Among these are 
the structural features of cyberspace relating 
to geography and infrastructure, the wide 
mix of relevant and interrelated actors along 
with the capabilities at their disposal, and 
the unique characteristics of activities in cy-
berspace that contribute to an exceptionally 
complex strategic environment. 
Even the most basic of strategic actions 
are easier to observe and interpret in the 
other domains due to their visibility and 
(usually) the ability to ascribe attribution. 
Basic concepts – including what consti-
tutes an “attack” in cyberspace or when a 
series of events could be labeled “cyberwar” 
– lack a commonly agreed upon framework. 
The United Nations Group of Governmental 
Experts (GGE) agreed in 2013 that interna-
tional law applies in cyberspace, but failed 
to reach a consensus in 2017 on a collective 
set of norms and principles.  Analysts must 
therefore exercise a great deal of caution, 
particularly when making analogies to the 
dynamics of other strategic relationships.
THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN CYBER 
EXPLOITATION AND CYBER ATTACK
One significant distinction has already been 
made between cyber exploitation and cyber 
attack. The former refers to infiltration and 
espionage. The latter refers to actions that 
cause actual damage ranging from the cor-
ruption or loss of data to physical effects 
such as damage to industrial processes or 
system paralysis (as in the case of Israel’s 
Operation Orchard or in a DDOS attack). 
Even so, the distinction between exploi-
tation and attack is fluid, particularly when 
networks must be infiltrated and probed as 
a precursor to launching attacks. NATO has 
warned that a cyber attack of sufficient mag-
nitude threatening critical military or civilian 
infrastructure may be enough to trigger an 
invocation of the alliance’s Article 5 collec-
tive defense clause.
Actions in cyberspace are easily shrouded 
in anonymity or disguised to appear as if 
other actors were in fact responsible. One 
simple and readily available method is TOR 
(The Onion Router), downloadable browser 
software used to access an open network and 
achieve anonymity via a group of volunteer-
operated host routers. 
At other times, entities such as govern-
ments or multinational corporations are 
loath to admit their networks have been 
compromised. Even if the intruders are iden-
tified, withholding that information may be 
desirable to retain some tactical advantage. 
Whereas physical proof may be more readily 
available in the other four domains, evidence 
of an attack and the identity of the attacker 
depends on not only solid cyber forensics 
but also the credibility of the victim/target 
reporting the attack.
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WIDE MIX OF ACTORS
Further complicating the attribution problem 
is the wide mix of actors in cyberspace and 
the ready availability of hacking expertise 
and premade exploits. Although state actors 
have far greater resources and expertise, the 
global reach of the Internet allows private 
actors with high-level hacking skills to gener-
ate attacks that would normally be consid-
ered strategic acts with large-scale impact 
– whether paralyzing air traffic control net-
works, erasing financial information or dis-
rupting power grids. The combinations are 
many: private actors attacking corporate net-
works to disrupt financial markets, private 
groups backed by a state attacking either 
corporate state actors or other states enti-
ties, state agencies “hacking back” against 
private actors. 
One prominent feature of cyberspace is 
the constant offensive-defensive battle con-
stantly occurring in the domain, with smaller 
attacks numbering in the millions each year. 
The threshold for conducting cyber attacks 
is clearly quite low, likely because the risk 
of human casualties is so far almost non-
existent. The visual effect of destroying data 
is far less dramatic than exploding buildings 
or infrastructure, even though the cumulative 
effect of a massive cyber attack may eventu-
ally be similar to a physical attack.
BORDERS
The lack of clearly defined borders in cy-
berspace creates another set of challenges. 
Geography still matters, particularly consid-
ering the physical layer of the Internet that 
includes fiberoptic cables and other tangible 
components of cyberspace. In the physical 
world, though, territorial borders, maritime 
exclusive economic zones, and national air-
space designations are designations that can 
be clearly demarcated and defended. 
The informational flow patterns in cyber-
space are far more diffuse and full of private 
actors supplying the digital infrastructure 
upon which societies rely to conduct a wide 
range of commerce and social interactions.  
State actors including defense ministries and 
intelligence services also rely on privately 
owned digital infrastructure to conduct their 
operations. This makes “pulling up the digital 
drawbridge” less feasible in our modern net-
worked society.
Yet “virtual borders” are emerging in a 
variety of forms. At one end of the spectrum, 
states with extremely limited digital net-
works – North Korea for example – are less 
vulnerable simply because the lack of digital 
infrastructure limits a potential attacker’s 
ability to penetrate deep into the country. In 
China, Internet use is widespread but tightly 
controlled in a layered approach. The physi-
cal infrastructure is routed through major 
cities and monitored, the state wields institu-
tional control over telecommunications com-
panies, and thousands of individual internet 
monitors police the Internet for subversive 
online behavior. European market democra-
cies face perhaps the greater challenge due 
to numerous entry points, interconnected 
networks, and strict civil liberty legal protec-
tions. 
Nevertheless, more active monitoring and 
“bulk interception” of digital communica-
tions crossing national boundaries are part 
of a re-assertion of national sovereignty 
in cyberspace. The proposal to establish a 
so-called “digital border defense” (digitalt 
grenseforsvar) in Norway can be viewed as 
part of this emerging trend. The monitoring 
and interception ability of national intel-
ligence services in other countries has been 
crucial for intelligence gathering, detecting 
and eventually establishing attribution for 
a range of security threats, including cyber 
attacks.  
CYBER DEFENSE
From a cybersecurity perspective, though, 
the first line of defense for an individual 
computer (or “endpoint”) is antivirus (AV) 
software and regular updates, which function 
as a highly automated filter identifying the 
signature characteristics of the hundreds of 
millions of pieces of known malware. As jour-
nalist Kim Zetter reported, “of the more than 
1 million malicious files Symantec and other 
AV firms receive monthly, the majority were 
variations of already-known viruses and 
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worms. These were processed automatically 
without human intervention. Algorithms 
searched the files for telltale strings of data 
or behavior to identify the malware.” 
Unfortunately, the rise of polymorphic 
malware that uses a technique allowing the 
underlying code to shift (and thus altering 
the malware’s signature) has limited the ef-
ficacy of traditional endpoint antivirus pro-
grams. More advanced defensive measures 
using machine learning are able to decon-
struct suspicious files to identify damaging 
code. In other cases, the malware can be iso-
lated by a virtual machine (sometimes called 
a “sandbox”) that is able to safely simulate in 
quarantine how the code will behave.
To defend an entire network, virtual fire-
walls able to filter external data are used in 
conjunction with similar antivirus software 
and more active defenses such as virtually 
testing suspicious files. These automated 
intrusion detection systems can also iden-
tify suspicious behavior. After a particularly 
egregious intrusion by the Chinese, Google 
and the NSA constructed a system to moni-
tor intrusions in Google’s networks. As Shane 
Harris reported, the system used 
[a]utomated sensors and algorithms to de-
tect malware or signs of an imminent attack 
and take action against them. One system, 
called Turmoil, detects traffic that might 
pose a threat. Then, another automated sys-
tem called Turbine decides whether to al-
low the traffic to pass or to block it. Turbine 
can also select from a number of offensive 
software programs and hacking techniques 
that a human operator can use to disable 
the source of the malicious attack … the 
source can be injected with a virus or spy-
ware, so the NSA can continue to monitor it.
PHYSICAL SEPARATION
The final and most extreme method of net-
work protection is the creation of an “air 
gap,” physically separating a network from 
the Internet. Critical infrastructure such as 
power grids are often air-gapped. Most mili-
tary and intelligence services have dual sys-
tems – one connected to the global Internet 
and another internal classified intranet. 
However, even an air-gapped system is 
vulnerable to human carelessness (exempli-
fied by flash drives used to transport the 
Stuxnet virus or in the Buckshot Yankee 
incident). Air-gapped networks can also be 
vulnerable to supply chain attacks or more 
advanced techniques such as using FM radio 
signals sent by an air-gapped computer’s 
graphics card to exfiltrate data. One piece of 
malware developed at an Israeli university, 
once inserted into an air-gapped computer, 
is able to adjust the rotation speed of the af-
fected computer’s cooling fan to achieve a 
particular frequency that can then be used 
to exfiltrate data to a nearby listening device 
such as a smart phone.
CYBER OFFENSE
Offensive operations in cyberspace, particu-
larly strategic CNA operations such as de-
veloping and planting the Stuxnet virus, are 
complex and require significant resources 
and expertise. The process of using a cyber 
weapon can be divided into a seven-step 
“cyber kill chain”: reconnaissance of the tar-
get network; weaponization of the malware; 
delivery of malware via a vulnerability, a USB 
drive or phishing; the exploit phase; installa-
tion onto the computer; command and con-
trol communication with the host machine; 
and lastly, completing the action by carrying 
out the objectives (corrupting data and/or 
computers, or causing physical damage to 
machines in the network).
Each of these steps is fraught with uncer-
tainty for any would-be attacker, particularly 
a state actor intent on carrying out a precise 
and predictable attack. The act of network 
infiltration – while a necessary precursor to 
an attack – also risks revealing information 
about the attacker, including the vulnerabili-
ties used to gain access. 
Without in-depth knowledge of the target 
network, however, malware cannot be spe-
cifically designed to function as the attacker 
intends. This is why CNE may be considered 
a hostile act even if no actual damage is done 
– it may be compared with a conventional 
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military exercise that violates the target’s 
national sovereignty to test the aggressor’s 
ability to launch an attack. Even with near-
perfect information regarding an adversary’s 
network, an attacker can never be completely 
certain how a malware cyberweapon will 
perform once released. 
THE ELEMENT OF SURPRISE
Just as the simulated attack also reveals how 
the aggressor might conduct an attack, us-
ing vulnerabilities and exploits – particularly 
zero-day vulnerabilities – also constitutes a 
“one-shot” capability.  Cyberattacks depend 
on the element of surprise. Once the exploits 
are used to gain access or launch a malware 
attack, the vulnerability is revealed and can 
be repaired or compensated for by the de-
fender. Even stockpiled exploits have expira-
tion dates (although these may be unknown) 
as software is updated and vulnerabilities 
are continually discovered and patched. 
This creates an unfortunate “use it or 
lose it” pressure for some cyberweapons. 
Additionally, the more specifically tailored 
the weapon’s code, the more likely it is to be 
effective but a narrowly focused weapon will 
have limited effect. As Thomas Rid and Peter 
McBurney argue, “the cost-benefit payoff of 
weaponized instruments of cyber-conflict 
may be far more questionable than generally 
assumed: target configurations are likely to 
be so specific that a powerful cyber-weapon 
may only be capable of hitting and acting on 
one single target, or very few targets at best.”
A surprise “bolt from the blue” attack may 
be rational from an operational standpoint 
but may not necessarily be effective in ac-
complishing any strategic objective unless 
connected to offensive threats in other do-
mains. Most networks can be repaired within 
hours or days, making the reduced level of 
trust in the network (i.e. is the network still 
compromised? Does the intruder still have 
access?) the most significant aspect of an 
attack. 
Clearly, some cyberattacks could have 
widespread consequences with the risk 
of significant loss of life (air traffic control 
networks, power grids during winter in 
northern climates) but perhaps not signifi-
cant enough to cause governments to cede 
sovereignty or territory. Even Stuxnet only 
managed to temporarily slow Iran’s enrich-
ment program, delaying any eventual nuclear 
weapon development by mere months.
CREDIBLE THREATS
Given the nature of cyberweapons, threaten-
ing or brandishing cyberweapons is chal-
lenging. It requires successfully penetrating 
an opponent’s network without releasing 
a payload but instead leaving unique signs 
or a “calling card” revealing the attacker’s 
identity to give the subsequent threat cred-
ibility. Afterwards, as Martin Libicki noted, 
“penetrating a system and persisting within 
it require similar skill sets but different tech-
nologies. Penetration requires knowledge of 
vulnerabilities; persistence requires knowing 
how to evade intrusion and anomaly detec-
tion systems” and neither does “breaking 
into a system prove the ability to break a 
system.” 
In this sense, the uncertainty surrounding 
the ability to retain access after announcing 
an intrusion and the uncertain effects of a 
cyberweapon make cyber threats less at-
tractive. On the other hand, such threats are 
more credible given that digital networks 
are the targets, rather than human lives (al-
though, again, the loss of certain networks 
might lead to loss of life). The political reac-
tions to a massive cyberattack have yet to be 
tested, making the risk of escalation equally 
uncertain.
CYBER DETERRENCE
These issues are central to deterrence in cy-
berspace. Deterrence is based on the concept 
of raising the costs – either through the cred-
ible threat of punitive attack (deterrence by 
punishment) or through defensive measures 
(deterrence by denial) – to persuade a po-
tential adversary to refrain from attacking. 
Given the issues raised above (attribution, 
credibly and repeatedly holding a network 
at risk over time) deterrence by punishment 
strategies in cyberspace are usually judged to 
be challenging. 
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As Joseph Nye has pointed out, however, 
deterrence by denial strategies are intrinsi-
cally attractive: “Good cyber defenses … can 
build resilience or the capacity to recover, 
which is worth in itself; they can also reduce 
the incentive for some attacks by making 
them look futile.” 
On the other hand, Annegret Bendiek and 
Tobias Metzger referenced a statement by 
Obama administration official Michael Daniel 
and noted that “deterrence-by-denial dif-
fers greatly, since in cyber ‘you have to work 
from the assumption that your networks are 




Nye also suggests dissuading cyber attacks 
through an emphasis on the interdependence 
(entanglement) relationships between ag-
gressor and target or through a methodical 
establishment of international norms (or 
taboos) against such attacks, particularly if 
the focus is on “a taboo not against certain 
types of weapons but against certain types of 
targets.” 
Deterring cyber attacks through kinetic 
means is always an option – an example of 
what has been termed “cross-domain deter-
rence.” For example, the Trump administra-
tion’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review signaled 
the possibility of nuclear retaliation to a 
non-nuclear attack on U.S. infrastructure or 
military command and control infrastructure 
that was widely interpreted to include a dev-
astating cyber attack.
Clearly, a nuclear retaliation in reaction 
to a cyber attack raises issues of proportion-
ate response, one of the main principles in 
the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). Although 
a massive counterattack might be dispro-
portionate, cyber attacks themselves are not 
necessarily LOAC compliant. In particular, 
the focus on civilian infrastructure and civil-
ian “collateral damage” is at odds with the 
principle of distinguishing between combat-
ants and non-combatants in a conflict, just as 
attacking a state’s digital infrastructure may 
not be necessary from a military perspective 
(compared with, for example, disabling an 
anti-aircraft sensor).
CYBER AS ONE COMPONENT IN  
CONFLICT
A strategic cyber conflict – that is, a cyberwar 
between two or more actors that continually 
results in real and widespread digital and/or 
physical damage – waged exclusively in cy-
berspace without spilling over into other do-
mains seems unlikely. Some scholars, such as 
Chris Demuchak, have argued that cyberwar 
is too narrow a term and we should instead 
prepare for cybered conflict, in which cyber-
space is simply one domain across which 
operations will take place. 
Martin Libicki suggested three operation-
al cyberspace attacks that would be valuable 
in a military conflict: eruption (the digital 
illumination of an adversary’s military tar-
gets to reveal their positions); disruption 
(temporarily degrading their systems as in 
Operation Orchard); or corruption (incapaci-
tating missile guidance systems or “bricking” 
an opponent’s computers). 
Clearly, it would be operationally advanta-
geous not to reveal that an adversary’s de-
fensive systems – such as air defenses – were 
compromised until an attack materialized so 
as not to risk losing the exploit, which limits 
its use as a coercive measure. Nevertheless, 
the ability to demonstrate a capacity to infil-
trate will lower the confidence in the defen-
sive value of such systems. 
MILITARY FORCE RELIES ON DIGITAL 
NETWORKS
Mirroring societal technological trends, mili-
tary force has over the past several decades 
become increasingly reliant on digital net-
works for situational awareness, communi-
cation, navigation, and targeting. Degrading 
these systems with cyber weapons would be 
a crippling disadvantage in a crisis or conflict 
situation. The command, control, and com-
munications infrastructure for nuclear weap-
ons systems (NC3) is of particular concern 
in this regard, with multiple pathways for 
infiltration through sensors and communica-
tion systems. 
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In the transatlantic context, defense ex-
perts James Miller and Richard Fontaine 
observed, “cyber penetration of critical in-
frastructure amounts to what the military 
calls ‘preparation of the battlespace.’ Russian 
cyber implants in the United States and other 
NATO countries provide potential leverage 
in a crisis, and – if push comes to shove – the 
ability to impose significant pain through 
non-kinetic, non-lethal cyber attacks.” 
NATO has also adopted a more proactive 
stance on defending against cyberattacks. 
A working group consisting of the United 
States, Britain, Germany, Spain, Denmark, 
the Netherlands and Norway began work in 
2017 on a cyber doctrine that will in part de-
termine when deployment of cyber weapons 
might be justified. 
In response to cyber threats, the Pentagon 
is examining ways in which to “harden” its 
digital networks and systems against cy-
berattacks, particularly given that many 
platforms contain commercial off-the-shelf 
software that may have pre-existing vulner-
abilities. Additionally, the U.S. Naval Academy 
has re-introduced courses on sextant use and 
celestial navigation to prepare sailors for an 
operational environment in which computer 
systems or Global Positioning System are 
rendered inoperable.  
CYBERSPACE WILL PLAY A CRUCIAL 
ROLE
It is becoming increasingly clear that cyber-
space will play a crucial role in any future 
conflict, simply because so many facets of so-
ciety – including state infrastructure, military 
systems, and social media – are vulnerable to 
degradation or manipulation. 
The battle over political influence is 
particularly intense in cyberspace. Twitter 
troll farms or Facebook campaigns like the 
Russian government-sponsored groups that 
actively sought to influence the 2016 presi-
dential elections in the United States are 
example of coordinated political influence 
activities that utilize social media platforms. 
Such activities are a significant threat to open 
democratic processes but should neverthe-
less be considered separate from hackers 
exploiting network vulnerabilities to cause 
irreparable damage.
One of the fundamental concerns with 
large numbers of Russian-controlled au-
tomated bots contributing to the political 
dialogue in the United States and elsewhere 
is attribution – the accounts are not clearly 
identified as belonging to agents linked to 
foreign governments. This allows groups to 
act as provocateurs, exacerbating existing po-
litical divisions to generate greater domestic 
discord in ways that would not be possible 
if the origin of the social media activity were 
apparent. Some attempts are underway to 
rectify this situation, including the Hamilton 
68 project at the German Marshall Fund that 
tracks Russian bot activity on Twitter. 
Although social media botnet campaigns 
similar to those waged by Russian groups in 
democratic election processes in the United 
States and Europe should not be considered 
cyber attacks, such tactics could play an im-
portant disinformation role in a future crisis 
scenario. False news videos spread via sites 
such as Facebook could incite violence in cer-
tain domestic groups or even provide justifi-
cation for state aggression. 
In a crisis, information warfare and cyber 
attacks may combine with artificial intelli-
gence, autonomous systems, and traditional 
forms of military conflict in a form that some 
have labeled “hyperwar.” Waging these types 
of conflicts – or deterring them, for that 
matter – entails a comprehensive approach 
that integrates cyber capabilities within the 
broader portfolio of military instruments of 
power.
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The rapid growth of artificial intelligence 
in the private sector and a similar interest 
among leading militaries with advanced 
technology almost certainly ensures that 
AI and autonomous machines will feature 
prominently in future defense acquisitions. 
Artificial intelligence will likely influence cy-
ber operations in at least three distinct ways. 
First, the advent of AI powered autono-
mous systems for civilian use, along with 
military autonomous weapon systems in the 
context of network-based warfare, will pres-
ent new digital vulnerabilities and therefore 
new threats. Second, offensive AI-driven 
cyber weapons will present new challenges 
to the security of digital networks and new 
opportunities to attack adversarial networks. 
Third, increasingly powerful offensive AI 
cyber weapons require equally capable AI-
powered defensive capabilities. These devel-
opments will in turn have significant strate-
gic implications.
THE DARPA CYBER CHALLENGE
In 2016, seven teams gathered in a Las Vegas 
hotel to compete in a cybersecurity compe-
tition hosted by the U.S. Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA). The goal 
of the 2016 DARPA Cyber Grand Challenge 
was to test the ability of an autonomous AI-
powered bot to independently repair secu-
rity vulnerabilities in its own machine while 
exploiting those of others.  On a $55 million 
virtual playing field constructed of seven 
supercomputers, isolated from any other net-
works and loaded with software for the com-
petitors to hack, each team’s bot searched 
and exploited vulnerabilities in the software 
while “deciding” how best to protect and re-
pair “holes” in their own system.
Through 96 rounds of competition, 
DARPA regularly introduced malicious soft-
ware previously discovered throughout the 
cyber sphere. Points were awarded for suc-
cessfully exploiting vulnerabilities in the 
other systems, while identifying and repair-
ing vulnerabilities to keep the teams’ own 
systems running. Some of the bots performed 
exceptionally well, discovering some threats 
much quicker than human analysts, while 
making strategic judgments regarding the 
balance between offense and defense. As one 
team leader explained to Wired journalist 
Cade Metz,
If the bot found a hole in its own machine, 
it wouldn’t necessarily decide to patch, in 
part because patches can slow a service 
down, but also because it can’t patch with-
out temporarily taking the service offline. 
Through a kind of statistical analysis, the 
bot weighed the costs and the benefits of 
patching and the likelihood that another 
bot would actually exploit the hole, and 
only then would it decide whether the 
patch made sense and would give it more 
points than it would lose.
The bots were far from infallible, as one 
system even chose to launch an attack on 
its own machine. While the contest revealed 
that the effectiveness of the autonomous bots 
remained far beneath that of human experts, 
the overall performance was surprisingly ef-
fective in some areas and demonstrated that 
AI controlled cyber weapons will necessitate equally powerful AI driven cyber de-
fenses, raising legitimate concerns about retaining adequate human control over 
these technologies. 
Article Three
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autonomous cyber defenses had significant 
potential.
AI CREATES BROADER CYBER THREAT
The strategic, legal, and ethical issues that 
arise with the deployment of autonomous 
systems – both civilian and military – have 
been addressed elsewhere in the academic 
literature, but the vulnerabilities of autono-
mous systems to digital threats is also highly 
relevant. The Internet of Things presents 
multiple entry points for attackers, and in-
creased automation and machine autonomy 
in everyday life itself represents a strategic 
vulnerability. 
Consider the spread of autonomous fea-
tures in automobiles. Just as aircraft use on-
board computer systems to control the func-
tionality of the craft, cars have similar digital 
functionality.  Computer-controlled driver as-
sistance features including anti-lock braking, 
driver-assist steering, automatic parking and 
“autopilot” provide opportunities for hackers 
to gain external control over the vehicle via 
onboard wi-fi or Bluetooth connectivity. 
Two hackers demonstrated this in 2015 
by using an online laptop not in close geo-
graphic proximity to the vehicle (a 2014 
Chrysler Jeep Cherokee) to gain access to its 
onboard systems, deactivating its brakes and 
transmission. 
For criminal networks, installing ransom-
ware that would require payment to regain 
control of the car is distinctly possible. More 
worrisome are exotic applications such as 
carrying out assassinations via auto accident. 
Even more broadly, it is worth emphasizing 
that the vulnerability exploited for the Jeep 
hack was manufacturer-wide and applied to 
entire classes of vehicles.  
At an autonomous vehicle conference in 
2017, cyber security expert Joshua Corman 
outlined possible consequences of this, de-
scribing one simulation in which an entire 
make of car (all Volkswagens, for example) 
were disabled to block bridge and tunnel 
traffic around New York City during a terror-
ist attack. As advances in AI enable fleets of 
autonomous vehicles for urban public trans-
portation, the networks upon which they 
depend are vulnerable to attacks that could 
cause large-scale civilian casualties. 
As military systems within a network-
based warfare framework become in-
creasingly autonomous – with intelligent 
unmanned system development in all do-
mains – the vulnerability of these to outside 
interference or control becomes a serious 
concern. Given the likelihood of autonomous 
swarms of weapons platforms in the future 
battlespace, an ability to corrupt, disable, or 
remotely steer the swarm would be decisive. 
The U.S. Army has installed AI systems 
in the ground control stations for its fleet 
of armed drones (the MQ-1C) giving them 
the ability to operate in human-managed 
swarms, but also incorporated AI cyber 
defenses to protect the system. The CEO 
of Scorpion Computing Services, Walter 
O’Brian, whose AI is used by the Army, ob-
served that “it’s an arms race.… Now I have 
an AI protecting the data center, and now the 
enemy would have to have an AI to attack my 
AI, and now its which AI is smarter.” 
AI AND CYBER OFFENSE
As the 2016 DARPA Cyber Challenge demon-
strated, the future of cyber warfare will be 
greatly influenced by artificial intelligence. 
A recent report by AI experts outlined a 
number of potential malicious uses for the 
technology. Among them was precisely the 
possibility of intelligent software and ma-
chine systems orchestrating large-scale au-
tomated attacks with an ability to react and 
tailor their methodology to environmental 
changes. 
The magnitude and relentlessness of high-
ly automated and intelligent probing of net-
work defenses or software analysis searching 
for vulnerabilities will almost certainly con-
stitute a powerful offensive cyber capability 
simply through the sheer mass and persis-
tence of the attacks. One simple threat might 
be a fully automated spear phishing system 
able to tailor tweets based on a particular 
user’s interests that have been gathered from 
online data such as social networks, increas-
ing the likelihood that they will click on a 
malicious link. 
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An even more complex and troubling sce-
nario suggested by one cybersecurity expert 
is an AI-powered botnet that “could dynami-
cally and fluidly react to countermeasures, 
intelligently developing its own complex 
warfare strategies beyond anything any hu-
man has ever developed, involving complex 
layering of attacks to mitigate standard coun-
termeasures and reacting at a speed that no 
human network administrators could hope 
to match.” 
Artificial intelligence and reinforcement 
learning can also be applied to craft intelli-
gent agents able to manipulate its own code 
to evade antivirus software. Rather than 
existing polymorphic malware using static 
pre-coded algorithms, the next generation 
may be able to autonomously and spontane-
ously generate new customized attacks using 
machine learning.   
Suggested approaches to detect this type 
of malware include the Malware Analysis 
and Attributed using Genetic Information 
(MAAGI) that leverages AI based on the simi-
larities between the behavior of malware and 
biological organisms.
The algorithms and architecture behind 
the AI itself will also be at risk. Counter-AI 
systems are under development to exploit 
the unique vulnerabilities in AI-powered 
autonomous systems. For example, machine-
learning systems can be corrupted by “poi-
soning” the training data sets in ways that 
lead the system to misclassify patterns, but 
in a predictable manner that may be advan-
tageous to an adversary. One study demon-
strated how so-called “adversarial patches” 
can be introduced to an image recognition 
deep learning system via images that are 
unable to be detected by the human eye but 
cause the AI to misclassify images.
AI AND CYBER DEFENSE
Offensive use of AI in cyber attacks will, as 
O’Brian stated, demand AI enabled defenses. 
One tool for cybersecurity is intrusion detec-
tion prevention systems (IDPS) that protect 
systems or networks by identifying normal 
usage patterns to detect abnormal and po-
tentially malicious behavior. 
Currently, IDPS has some inherent weak-
nesses, including low detection rates for ab-
normal behavior, limitations in data process-
ing, an inability to handle abrupt changes to 
data traffic volume, and a lack of automation 
that often requires human intervention and 
analysis. 
These challenges can arguably be ad-
dressed using AI, particularly since large data 
flows and pattern recognition are among the 
most prominent features of artificial intel-
ligence applications. For example, intelligent 
agents equipped with decision-making and 
self-learning abilities might be used to moni-
tor networks for threats during their recon-
naissance phase, perhaps even modeled after 
the human body’s immune system. 
Neural networks can be useful for moni-
toring network traffic by identifying normal 
patterns of use and thereby also enabling 
the system to detect abnormal and thus po-
tentially malicious activity. Deep neural net-
works might even be able to go further, using 
network data to successfully predict attacks. 
AI expert systems are already widely in use 
to assist humans in evaluating potentially 
malicious activities or auditing infiltrated 
system data, providing a set of options if 
threats are discovered.
Similarly, the winner of the 2016 DARPA 
Cyber Challenge – an AI software called 
“Mayhem” – is being adapted to automati-
cally find and patch flaws in commercial soft-
ware, including internet routers. Although 
still at the demonstrator stage, its engineers 
envision scenarios in which large-scale at-
tacks such as the 2016 Mirai botnet attack 
can be averted by not only automatically 
detecting the attack and identifying the vul-
nerability but also patching it automatically 
before more systems are infected. One inhib-
iting factor to implementation of the technol-
ogy is the reliance on AI to make decisions 
and relegate humans to a monitoring role in 
the decision loop. 
STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS
There is an ongoing race for artificial intel-
ligence. Unlike previous arms races, this 
competition is more democratic, more egali-
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tarian, and therefore more unpredictable in 
nature. 
Previous generations of strategic competi-
tion were dictated by access to natural re-
sources and industrial capacity, which could 
then be utilized by human ingenuity. The 
components necessary to substantially and 
negatively impact the lives of entire countries 
remained largely in the hands of nation-
states, whether it was a nuclear armed long 
range ballistic missile or a chemical or bio-
logical agent (although the latter is in the 
midst of a disturbing revolution of its own). 
In contrast, artificial intelligence technol-
ogy will “supercharge” tools and techniques 
in cyberspace, and is being driven forward 
by the civilian sector. The raw materials nec-
essary for developing a powerful AI agent 
– intellectual capacity and computing power 
– are widespread, more easily accessible, and 
more easily employed than other weapons of 
mass destruction. 
The strategic landscape within cyberspace 
is therefore more complex than in other 
domains that are completely dominated by 
national militaries, because much smaller 
actors can compete against regional or global 
powers in ways unimaginable in other do-
mains. 
The fact that the premiere U.S. actor in 
cyberspace – the NSA – can itself be hacked 
and its cyberweapon stockpiles stolen speaks 
volumes about the realities of the domain. 
This fact makes strategic decision-making 
in cyberspace far more difficult simply be-
cause the threats are less visible and the risk 
of strategic surprise is greater. Access to AI 
technology and techniques will offer pow-
erful advanced machine intelligence to any 
number of groups able to pay for it, and the 
proliferation risks may be difficult to man-
age. 
AUTOMATION AND AUTONOMY
The trend toward greater automation and 
machine autonomy is likely to continue in 
the realm of military technology for the same 
reasons it will continue in the civilian sector 
– the advantages are simply too numerous 
to ignore. As machine intelligence becomes 
more prevalent in autonomous systems on 
the conventional battlefield, it will increase 
the speed of tactical engagements as AI sys-
tems analyze and respond to an adversary’s 
actions. 
The decision loop may become so trun-
cated that human decision-making will be 
too slow to be decisive on the battlefield, par-
ticularly when faced with networked swarms 
of smaller armed air- or sea-based platforms. 
Speed and mass may soon reverse the cur-
rent well-established trend toward fewer 
advanced systems such as aircraft carriers or 
F-35 fighter aircraft. Reliance on autonomous 
platforms will increase the scope of cyber-
space to include these systems and their net-
works both as potential targets for infiltra-
tion and as systems in need of cybersecurity. 
These tactical dynamics affected by AI, 
while potentially game-changing on the 
conventional battlefield, may be even more 
significant in cyberspace. The speed of cyber 
engagements already overwhelms human 
operators, who rely on algorithm-driven 
automated defenses to cope with the sheer 
number of continuous threats. New gen-
erations of autonomous intelligent agents 
will be able to continually probe and attack 
defenses while another set of policing intel-
ligent agents monitor networks and respond 
independently to possible intrusions. 
The speed of these “engagements” will of-
ten be near-instantaneous and slower human 
decision-making will become a disadvantage, 
as will those who fail to pursue AI technol-
ogy. Even if humans retain a primary deci-
sion-making role, the situational awareness 
leading to those decisions will increasingly 
rely on AI for network monitoring and analy-
sis, offering humans a choice of pre-sorted 
response options.
VERIFICATION OF BREACHES
Human reliance on digital networks for situ-
ational awareness in physical domains is 
hardly new, but awareness in cyberspace 
relies on machines not only for the individual 
pieces of information but also an analysis of 
this information.  As autonomous systems 
become an increasingly integral part of mili-
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tary operations, detection, verification, and 
attribution of network breaches will have 
heightened strategic implications. When AI 
agents monitor a network, humans will be 
required to trust that its analysis of the in-
truders is correct. 
This trust may be tenuous, particularly 
when machine-learning algorithms based 
on neural networks are in essence a “black 
box” that so far have been unable to provide 
observable evidence of their decision-making 
processes. How are humans to know when 
their AI is functioning correctly and has not 
been infiltrated by an adversary? 
The “black box” challenge of AI becomes 
a central issue, particularly when algorithms 
behave in unpredictable ways. Financial mar-
kets are now dominated by machine-trading 
algorithms, resulting in several inexplicable 
“flash crashes” such as those seen in May 
2010 and February 2018. The new tech-
niques uncovered by AlphaGo Zero were un-
anticipated by its human creators; other AI 
derived solutions (such as how to respond to 
a particular cyber attack) may elicit unantici-
pated solutions that are difficult for humans 
to evaluate prior to implementation. 
Some researchers push back against this 
concern, citing the equally difficult task of 
understanding human decision-making and 
motivations. In the New York Times, Vijay 
Pande wonders if such criticisms are based 
not on the fact that “we can’t ‘see’ AI’s rea-
soning but that as AI gets more powerful, 
the human mind becomes the limiting factor. 
It’s that in the future, we’ll need AI to under-
stand AI.”
THE FUTURE OF AI
AI has already altered cyberspace. The ques-
tion is not whether the technology will influ-
ence the strategic dynamics in the domain, 
but rather how much. The progress made by 
artificial intelligence research over the past 
decade has wildly exceeded expectations and 
generated a wave of literature and specula-
tion over future progress. It may be worth 
contemplating futurist Roy Amara’s observa-
tion that “we tend to overestimate the effect 
of a technology in the short run and underes-
timate the effect in the long run.” 
Rodney Brooks, former director of the 
AI lab at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, argued in the same 2017 piece 
that machine learning remains limited and 
inflexible or “brittle.” Brooks notes that “we 
have seen a sudden increase in performance 
of AI systems thanks to the success of deep 
learning. Many people seem to think that 
means we will continue to see AI perfor-
mance increase by equal multiples on a regu-
lar basis.” 
The long-term effects of AI may be dra-
matic, but they might in fact be more limited 
than we now assume. Perhaps the advances 
in deep learning – a decades-old concept just 
now coming to fruition – will now stagnate. 
As another author succinctly phrased it, 
“maybe we’re not actually at the beginning of 
a revolution. Maybe we’re at the end of one.”
SINGULARITY
At the other end of the spectrum are experts 
concerned about the very future of the hu-
man race. In 1993, Vernor Vinge philoso-
phized in an article entitled “The Coming 
Technological Singularity: How to Survive 
in a Post-Human Era” about an age in which 
machine intelligence surpasses that of hu-
mans, an event scholars label “the singular-
ity” (based on a more general term for a 
paradigm altering technological advance). 
Given the exponential growth in com-
puting power, the ability of AI software to 
analyze data at astounding rates, and the 
emerging ability of AI to write its own AI 
software, it seems plausible that machine in-
telligence may evolve to an artificial general 
intelligence or “superintelligence.” Thought 
leaders ranging from Ray Kurtzweil and the 
late Stephen Hawking to Elon Musk have ex-
pressed concern for this development. 
Philosopher Nick Bostrom argues that 
machine general intelligence may present an 
existential threat to humans and that “before 
the prospect of an intelligence explosion, we 
humans are like small children playing with 
a bomb.”
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THE THIRD REVOLUTION IN WARFARE
The development of AI and its weaponiza-
tion is proceeding far more rapidly than our 
understanding of the strategic, societal, and 
humanitarian implications of the technology. 
This evolution is creating new challenges for 
law, policy, and governance at domestic and 
international levels. In July 2015, over one 
thousand researchers, scholars and thought 
leaders published an open letter warning 
about the potential hazards of autonomous 
weapons, described as the third revolution in 
warfare, after gunpowder and nuclear arms. 
The letter’s authors argued that “artificial 
Intelligence (AI) technology has reached a 
point where the deployment of such systems 
is — practically if not legally — feasible 
within years, not decades.” The letter con-
cluded that a “key question for humanity 
today” was “whether to start a global AI arms 
race or to prevent” one, since a global AI 
arms race would almost inevitably result in 
autonomous weapons, which would not be 
beneficial to humankind. The consequences 
of machine superintelligence controlling 
cyberspace are impossible to predict, but 
unanticipated actions by machine-based in-
telligent agents are likely and not necessarily 
controllable by human operators.
Arms control measures for AI itself ap-
pear difficult to construct at this point, not 
least due to the dual-use nature of the tech-
nology and a host of serious verification 
issues. Machine intelligence in lethal autono-
mous weapons systems (LAWS), on the other 
hand, has seen some political mobilization 
for a ban on such systems. 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The most relevant legal framework for a 
LAWS ban falls under the purview of the 
United Nations Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons (CCW). In May 2014, 
the subject of lethal autonomous weapon 
systems was included in the annual CCW 
meeting in Geneva. 
In addition to these discussions, individ-
ual countries such as Norway are evaluating 
various alternative options. In its 2015 re-
port, the Council on Ethics for the Norwegian 
Government Pension Fund Global included a 
chapter evaluating the ethical and legal im-
plications of autonomous weapon systems.
As is often the case with new technolo-
gies, civilian and military researchers are rac-
ing to develop new tools and methodologies. 
The doctrinal development evaluating how 
these new technologies might be used often 
lags behind, particularly in a security spiral 
dynamic where first mover advantage is 
usually considered desirable. Social science 
research and strategic planning that explores 
the possible uses and consequences of AI 
development and applications in cyberspace 
should at least attempt to keep pace with 
technological advances. 
This report serves only as an overview 
and introduction to the fields of AI and cyber 
– many of the topics briefly addressed here 
could easily be more deeply and thoroughly 
explored. We need a better conceptual un-
derstanding of these fast-moving technologi-
cal advances while they are still under devel-
opment. The potential consequences of wea-
ponized AI in cyberspace are too profound to 
wait until such systems are fully developed, 
and that understanding is currently woefully 
inadequate for policymakers to judge the po-
tential consequences of AI for international 
security.
Artificial Intelligence and Cyber Power
© Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, Oslo 2018. ISSN 1894-4795
IFS Insights 4/2018 32
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING
ALLEN, GREG AND TANIEL CHAN
2017. Artificial Intelligence and National Security. Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Har-
vard Kennedy School of Government.
BENDIEK, ANNEGRET AND TOBIAS METZGER
2015. Deterrence Theory in the Cyber-Century, Working Paper RD EU/Europe 2015, Stiftung Wissenschaft 
und Politik.
CLARKE, RICHARD AND ROBERT KNAKE
2010. Cyber War. New York: HarperCollins.
DEMCHAK, CHRIS AND PETER DOMBROWSKI, 
2011. “Rise of a Cybered Westphalian Age”, Strategic Studies Quarterly, vol. 5:1, pp. 32–61. 
FISCHERKELLER, MICHAEL 
2017. “Incorporating Offensive Cyber Operations into Conventional Deterrence Strategies” Survival, vol. 
59, no. 1.
FUTURE OF HUMANITY INSTITUTE AND UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD ET.AL. 
2018. The Malicious Use of Artificial Intelligence: Forecasting, Prevention and Mitigation.
HANSBØ, MORTEN 
2017. «Robotikk, kampkraft og bærekraft i framtidens Forsvar», Norsk Militært Tidsskrift vol. 187:3, pp. 
4–13.
HARRIS, SHANE
2014. @war. Boston: Mariner Books.
ILACHINSKI, ANDREW
2017. AI, Robots, and Swarms: Issues, Questions, and Recommended Studies. Alexandria, VA: CNA. 
KANIA, ELSA B. 
2017. Battlefield Singularity: Artificial Intelligence, Military Revolution, and China’s Future Military Power. 
Washington DC: Center for a New American Security.
KRAMER, FRANKLIN D., STUART H. STARR AND LARRY WENTZ (EDS.) 
2009. Cyberpower and National Security. Washington DC: Potomac Books.
LEWIS-KRAUS, GIDEON
2016. “The Great AI Awakening”, New York Times, 14 December.
LIBICKI, MARTIN C. 
2009. Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp.
LIBICKI, MARTIN
2013. Brandishing Cyberattack Capabilities. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp.
MULLER, LILLY PIJNENBURG, LARS GJESVIK AND KARSTEN FRIIS
2018. Cyber-weapons in International Politics. Norwegian Institute of International Affairs.
NILSSON, NILS
2009. The Quest for Artificial Intelligence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
NYE, JOSEPH S. JR.
2016/2017. “Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace” International Security, vol. 41:3, pp. 44–71.
RID, THOMAS AND PETER MCBURNEY
2012. “Cyber-weapons”, RUSI Journal, vol. 157: 1, pp. 6–13.
Artificial Intelligence and Cyber Power
© Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, Oslo 2018. ISSN 1894-4795
IFS Insights 4/2018 33
SANGER, DAVID
2012.  Confront and Conceal. New York: Crown Publishers.
SCHARRE, PAUL. 
2018. Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War. New York: W. W. Norton & Co.
SINGER, P.W.
2009. Wired for War. New York: Penguin Books.
SINGER, P.W. AND ALAN FRIEDMAN
2014. Cybersecurity and Cyberwar: What everyone needs to know. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
STANFORD UNIVERSITY 
2016. Artificial Intelligence and Life in 2030: One Hundred Year Study on Artificial Intelligence, Report of the 
2015 Panel.
TYUGU, ENN 
2011. “Artificial Intelligence in Cyber Defense,” Paper presented at the 3rd International Conference on 
Cyber Conflict, Tallinn, Estonia, 7–10 June.
WIRKUTTIS, NADINE AND HADAS KLEIN
2017. “Artificial Intelligence in Cybersecurity”, Cyber, Intelligence, and Security vol. 1:1.
ZETTER, KIM
2014.  Countdown to Zero Day. New York: Broadway Books.
IFS INSIGHTS
IFS Insights aims to provide a flexible on-
line forum for articles, comments and wor-
king papers within the fields of activity of 
the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies. 
All views, assessments and conclusions are 
the author’s own. The author’s permission 
is required for any reproduction, wholly or 
in part, of the contents.
Editor: Anna Therese Klingstedt
 
INSTITUTT FOR FORSVARSSTUDIER
The Norwegian Institute for Defence 
Studies (IFS) is a part of the Norwegian 
Defence University College (FHS). As an in-
dependent university college, FHS conducts 
its professional activities in accordance with 
recognised scientific, pedagogical and ethi-
cal principles (pursuant to the Act pertai-
ning to Universities and University Colleges, 
section 1-5).
Director: Kjell Inge Bjerga
Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies
Kongens gate 4




CENTRE FOR TRANSATLANTIC 
STUDIES
Despite the changing international balance of 
power and America’s global footprint, trans-
atlantic relations, now as before, remain of 
particular importance to Norway. This is why 
it is so important to understand US strategic 
thinking and defence policy priorities. 
The Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies 
has a long tradition of research into trans-
atlantic politics. The aim of the Centre for 
Transatlantic Studies is to deliver in-depth 
analyses of selected but important aspects of 
US conduct on the international stage, ap-
plying both historical and political science 
approaches and concentrating on relations 
with Europe. 





Michael Mayer is a Senior Fellow at the 
Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies. He lec-
tures and conducts research on military technol-
ogy and international security, with a particular 
focus on American foreign and security policy.
Among his previous publications include 
“Strategic Uncertainty and Missile Defence: 
Revisiting the 1999 National Intelligence 
Estimate” in Contemporary Security Policy, 
December 2015, and “The New Killer Drones: 
understanding the strategic implications of next-
generation unmanned combat aerial vehicles” in 
International Affairs, July 2015. 
Top picture on the front page:  
Graphic design:  U.S. Army illustration.
